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Post-Instruction Issues:
Jury Deliberations and Verdict
John F. Decker*
I. INTRODUCTION
After a jury in a criminal case has received the evidence presented by
the state and the defense, has heard closing argument from counsel, and
has been provided instruction about the law that is pertinent to
resolution of the case, it enters the critical stage of deliberating the fate
of the accused and arriving, if possible, at a verdict. However, a myriad
of problems can occur during this stage. Consider the following
examples. A juror visits the scene of a crime and proceeds to take
measurements, which indicate that the defendant in no way could have
shot the accused from the angle discussed during trial. The juror
informs other jurors of this information, which causes the jury
foreperson to send a note about this to the judge. Second, consider a
case where a jury foreperson informs a judge that another juror has
stated that she will not make her decision based on the evidence
presented at trial, but rather on her own moral beliefs. Third, a judge
declares a mistrial after two hours of deliberations in order to catch a
plane to Palm Springs for his long-planned two-week vacation, even
though the jurors give no indication that they are deadlocked. Fourth,
an alternate juror goes to the jury room with twelve jurors to deliberate.
Immediately, this alternate reports to the twelve that defendant is
"guilty as hell." This is not discovered until after several hours of
deliberations. In yet another case, a jury returns a sealed verdict finding
defendant guilty. After reading the guilty verdict in open court, several
jurors become agitated and the foreperson immediately advises the court
that they had apparently signed the wrong verdict form. Or, assume an
accused is on trial for battery of an employee. The evidence indicates
that the accused, without provocation, had slapped his employee in the
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face with his open hand. The trial court instructs the jury that a battery
has occurred if the accused "intentionally or knowingly without legal
justification and by any means causes bodily harm" to his victim.
During jury deliberations, the trial judge receives the following note
from the jury foreperson: "If a person merely slaps another in the face,
is this 'bodily harm'? Could you please clarify what you mean by
'bodily harm'? We want further instruction." The judge refuses to
respond to the question. Finally, assume a court releases jurors from
deliberations on their verdicts to their homes for the night, instructing
them to refrain from discussing the case or their deliberations until they
reconvene the next morning. Defense counsel makes an objection and
insists on a sequestration.
The focus of this Article involves examination of this very important
part of a criminal trial and the multitude of concerns, like the
hypotheticals described above, that can arise following commencement
of jury deliberations. Part II of this article examines jury questions and
requests ranging from asking for clarification of instructions to requests
for examination of physical evidence in the jury room.1  Part III
addresses the troublesome problem of when it is determined that the fact
finder has been exposed to or has been considering "extraneous matter,"
information not in evidence that carries the potential of prejudicing the
case. 2 Next, Part IV deals with communications between the judge and
jury that may be problematic on appeal. 3 Most important here is the
prohibition against ex parte communication between the judge and jury.
Other concerns that can arise from these communications are allegations
that the judge's conduct effectively "coerced" the jury to reach a
premature verdict, where the judge might have ordered a mistrial
because of the great difficulty the jurors were having in reaching a
verdict. Part V reflects a discussion of the problems arising when a jury
claims it is unable to reach a verdict. 4 This subject is tied to the judge's
decision to order a mistrial, where in some instances it is claimed that
the trial court's order was too soon and in others too late. Part VI
examines whether sequestration may be required during deliberations. 5
Part VII then discusses several issues that have arisen as a result of the
1. See infra Part II (discussing general rules governing jury instructions, questions of law or
fact, requests for review of testimony or evidence, and questions unique to capital cases).
2. See infra Part III (examining the ramifications of extraneous matter on jury deliberations).
3. See infra Part IV (discussing types of prohibited communications between the jury and the
judge).
4. See infra Part V (examining the concerns arising from deadlocked juries).
5. See infra Part VI (discussing the Illinois Supreme Court Rules that permit juries to be
sequestered to eliminate problems associated with extraneous matter).
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Illinois law authorizing jury note taking. 6  Part VIII considers the
procedures for receiving a jury verdict, including polling a jury and
problems associated with the jury's completion of verdict forms. 7
Finally, Part IX addresses the possibility of seating an alternate juror
during deliberations. 8
II. QUESTIONS AND REQUESTS FROM THE JURY
A. General Rules
A trial court has a "duty to answer the jury's question if clarification
is requested, the original instructions are incomplete, the jurors are
confused, or the question concerns a point of law arising from the facts
over which doubt or confusion exists." 9 A trial court, however, may
exercise its discretion and properly decline to answer a jury's question
during deliberations where:
(1) the instructions are readily understandable and sufficiently explain
the relevant law, (2) further instructions would serve no useful
purpose or would potentially mislead the jury, (3) the jury's inquiry
involves a question of fact, and (4) the giving of an answer would
cause the court to express an opinion that would likely direct a verdict
one way or the other. 10
In responding to a jury question or request, the "proper procedure" is to
address the entire jury, with the defendant present.' Where the
exchange between the judge and jury regarding instructions occurs
outside the presence of the defendant and his attorney, it may constitute
reversible error. 12 In one case, however, where the trial court had
6. See infra Part VII (examining the controversy surrounding note taking by jurors).
7. See infra Part VIII (discussing jury polling and the problems that arise from incomplete jury
verdict forms).
8. See infra Pan IX (examining concerns that arise through the use of alternate jurors).
9. People v. Carroll, 751 N.E.2d 44, 47 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2001).
10. People v. Brown, 745 N.E.2d 173, 184 (II1. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2001) (citing People v.
Childs, 636 N.E.2d 534, 539 (111. 1994)); see also People v. Reid, 554 N.E.2d 174, 179 (I11. 1990)
(noting several circumstances where a court may appropriately decline to answer a jury's
question).
11. People v. Sparks, 731 N.E.2d 987, 992 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2000) (disapproving the trial
court's action in summoning the foreperson back to the courtroom alone, but holding that no error
had occurred, in part, because the court simply informed the foreperson that no further
clarification of the law would be provided).
12. People v. Harmon, 244 N.E.2d 358, 361-62 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1968) (holding that
reversible error had occurred where the jury informed the bailiff it had a question about the law,
and the judge told the bailiff to tell the jury that legal questions would be resolved by the court, as
such communication between the court and the jury occurred outside the presence of the
defendant and his attorney).
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instructed the jury that they had received all instructions available, after
consulting with the prosecution and defense counsel, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by providing the same response to later jury
questions without again consulting the parties. 13 Occasionally, where
the trial judge is unavailable, a substitute judge may be called upon to
address a jury question. A substitute judge, appointed after the jury
begins its deliberations, has the authority and, where necessary, the
obligation to rule on issues that arise during jury deliberations. The
substitute judge's failure to address such issues could be a basis for
reversal. 14
In response to jury questions, a trial court cannot submit new charges
or new theories to the jury after it commences its deliberations because
doing so deprives the defense of the opportunity to address the new
issue in closing argument. 15 The Illinois Supreme Court has held that
this type of communication is contrary to both an accused's right to due
process and Illinois statutory mandate. 16 Where a jury arrives at a
verdict before the trial judge has an opportunity to respond to a question
from the jury, however, there is no error. 17 Finally, the mere fact that a
jury asks a question of the trial court or requests review of evidence
cannot be used by the defense to establish that the jury had a reasonable
doubt about the defendant's guilt.18
13. People v. Hemphill, 594 N.E.2d 1279, 1285 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1992).
14. People v. Hill, 735 N.E.2d 191, 197 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2000) (reversing the trial
court's conviction where a substitute judge refused to answer the jury's question).
15. People v. Millsap, 724 N.E.2d 942, 946 (Il1. 2000). In People v. Millsap, an accountability
instruction was given, after the jury had commenced deliberations, in response to a jury question
about whether the accomplice was equally guilty as an offender who actually caused injury in a
home invasion. Id. at 945. On appeal, the defendant argued that the accountability instruction
violated federal constitutional due process and 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1107(c), which requires
instructions to be communicated to the parties prior to closing argument. Id. at 947. The Illinois
Supreme Court held that the instruction constituted reversible error even though there was
evidence presented at trial that indicated there may have been another person present with the
defendant in the victim's home during the robbery because the defendant was deprived of the
opportunity to address the accountability issue during closing arguments. Id. at 948.
16. Id. at 947.
17. People v. Sims, 519 N.E.2d 921, 935 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1987) (upholding defendant's
conviction and finding no error had occurred where the judge was presiding over an argument in
another case when the jury sent a question to the judge, and the judge was unable to answer the
question before the jury reached a verdict).
18. People v. Minniweather, 703 N.E.2d 912, 916 (11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1998) ("That the jury
asked for guidance during deliberations merely indicates that the jury took its job seriously and
conscientiously worked to come to a just decision.").
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B. Questions Regarding Law/Instructions
In cases where the jury raises an explicit question about a point of
law arising from facts over which there is doubt or confusion, the court
must attempt to clarify the issues in the minds of the jury members.
Case law indicates that the judge should respond to the jury's questions
even though the jury was initially given proper instructions. 19 Where
the jury is obviously confused about the law, answers to jury questions
are essential.20 The failure to clarify an instruction that is confusing to
the jury will require reversal when such failure may have been
prejudicial to the defendant. 21  The clearest basis for a finding of
19. People v. Cortes, 692 N.E.2d 1129. 1142 (111.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 882 (1998); People
v. Sanders, 469 N.E.2d 287, 290 (II1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1984).
20. People v. Childs, 636 N.E.2d 534, 541-42 (I11. 1994) (reversing a defendant's conviction
where a trial court refused to answer a jury's question as to whether the defendant could be found
guilty of armed robbery and either voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, or alternatively, if a
finding of armed robbery mandated a guilty verdict for murder, as the trial court's initial
erroneous instruction contributed to juror confusion); People v. Landwer, 664 N.E.2d 677, 682-
83 (111. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1996) (determining that a trial court's failure to answer ajury's question,
asked on three separate occasions, as to the meaning of the word "originated," in conjunction
with a defendant's entrapment defense, was reversible error); People v. Shannon, 564 N.E.2d
198, 202-03 (Il. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1990) (requiring reversal where the trial court refused to
respond to a juror inquiry during deliberations as to whether the "intent" requirement of an
aggravated battery charge was satisfied if a defendant merely intended to throw a rock that
injured a victim, or instead, if it was required that the intent was to do bodily harm by throwing
the rock).
21. People v. Brown, 745 N.E.2d 173. 184 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2001); People v. Flynn, 526
N.E.2d 579, 583 (I11. App. Ct. Ist Dist. 1988); People v. Morris, 401 N.E.2d 284, 286 (I11. App.
Ct. 2d Dist. 1980); see also People v. Kucala, 288 N.E.2d 622, 626-27 (Ill. App. Ct. Ist Dist.
1972) (ordering a new trial because the trial court's failure to respond to the jury's written request
for clarification as to when a "forcible felony starts," for purposes of their understanding of
forcible felony instruction relating to the murder charge, was prejudicial to the defendant).
In People v. Brown, the trial judge refused to respond to the jury's question as to whether it
could convict the defendant of the instant charge based on a prior incident. Brown. 745 N.E.2d at
180. The appellate court reversed, holding that such a question suggested jury confusion
regarding the concept of limited purpose for which "other-conduct" evidence had been admitted
(that is, in regard to the issues of a defendant's intent, knowledge, and lack of accident) and was
further complicated by the fact that the instructions failed to state this evidence could "only" be
considered for this limited purpose. Id. at 184.
In People v. Fiynn, the trial court refused to answer jury questions regarding (1) an additional
charge that had been nolle prossed by the State, and (2) whether opposing lawyers could have
called a co-defendant to the stand. Flynn, 526 N.E.2d at 582. The appellate court found
reversible error because refusing to answer question (1) may have caused the jury to infer that the
defendant pled guilty to nolle prossed charge, and refusing to answer question (2) should have
resulted in the jury not being informed that the co-defendant had a right to refuse to testify. Id. at
583.
In People v. Morris, the jury asked the trial court if a person could be found guilty of burglary
based on his possession of stolen property even though the person himself never entered the
burglarized premises, and while the trial court had not previously instructed the jury on the theory
of accountability, it responded that the jury "must decide the case on the instructions as given."
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reversible error occurs when the trial court either: (1) refuses to permit
the jury to inform the court as to which portion of the instructions were
confusing or (2) indicates that it has no authority whatsoever to clarify
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions. 22 However, where further clarification
of an instruction will somehow require the judge to reflect upon his or
her opinion of the strength of the evidence or to direct the jury to
conclude that the defendant is likely guilty, the trial court cannot
attempt to further clarify an instruction.23
Where the instructions themselves are "clear and in common
language which the jury could understand," the judge may respond that
no further clarification is required.24 Thus, if the trial court simply
advises the jury to utilize the "common meaning" of the words in an
instruction about which they have questions, the trial court's action may
be satisfactory, assuming the words are not clearly ambiguous. 25
Giving a jury a dictionary to determine the "common meaning" of terms
of the instruction, however, is error. 26
As with a judge's original instructions to a jury, if the trial court
misstates the law when responding to a jury question about the
Morris, 401 N.E.2d at 285. The appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction because the
jury was obviously confused and may have convicted the defendant as an accomplice even
though there was no charge to that effect. Id. at 286.
22. Compare People v. Land, 340 N.E.2d 44, 45-46 (Il1. App. Ct. Ist Dist. 1975) (holding that
the trial judge's statement, "I cannot interpret the instructions for you, you must read these
instructions and interpret them yourself .... I wish I could, but it would be error if I did,"
constituted reversible error because a trial court cannot refuse to consider jury questions
regarding instructions), with People v. Reid, 554 N.E.2d 174, 180-81 (I11. 1990) (stating that no
abuse of discretion or prejudice to defendant occurred where the jury asked if it could find the
defendant guilty of one charge and not guilty of another, the judge directed the jury to follow the
original instructions, and the jury thereafter found defendant guilty of murder and armed
robbery), and People v. Sanders, 345 N.E.2d 757, 761-62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1976) (holding
that the trial court properly refused to inquire into a statement from the jury foreperson that the
jury was having difficulty with "the interpretation of one of the instructions," as the jury request
for clarification was too general to warrant a response from the court).
23. People v. Charles, 360 N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (II1. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1977).
24. Id.
25. Compare People v. Lee, 745 N.E.2d 78, 92 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2001) (finding that the
trial court's refusal to attempt to clarify the terms "legally responsible" and "aiding and abetting"
was proper), People v. Tokich, 734 N.E.2d 117, 122 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2000) (holding that
the trial court's refusal to define "reasonable doubt" was proper), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1174
(2001), and People v. Jedlicka, 405 N.E.2d 844, 849-50 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1980) (upholding
the trial court's refusal to clarify questions about the meaning of "deception" and "permanently
deprive," among others), with People v. Sparks, 731 N.E.2d 987, 992 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist.
2000) (holding the trial court's failure to answer a jury request that was not factual, but one of
pure law (to wit, does the crime of unlawful restraint have a minimum time element) was error
although not reversible).
26. Jedlicka, 405 N.E.2d at 851 (finding the jury's use of a dictionary was error, but not
reversible error).
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instructions, the misstatement is clear error.27  In addition, it is
reversible error for a trial court to respond to questions about the law by
providing supplemental instructions that rely on additional legal theory
that was not supported by evidence. 28 Of course, if the trial court
correctly addresses the jury's question regarding a point of law, a
defendant has no basis whatsoever to claim prejudice. 29 Moreover,
where a defendant not only fails to object to the trial court's refusal to
clarify a jury instruction, but also specifically agrees to the refusal, the
issue may be waived.30 Where the trial court, in response to a jury
question about the law, refers to a particular portion of the jury
instructions as helpful in answering their question, this does not amount
to improper emphasis of a particular basis for liability.
31
C. Questions Regarding Facts/Interpretation of Evidence
Obviously, a jury trial presupposes that the jury resolves all questions
of fact crucial to the issue of guilt or innocence. Therefore, if the jury's
question calls for the trial court's evaluation of facts or evidence, it will
constitute reversible error for a judge to answer such questions.32 The
27. See People v. Shaw, 713 N.E.2d 1161, 1173-74 (111. 1998) (reversing where the trial court
erroneously answered a jury question about an armed robbery charge based on an accountability
theory); People v. Dennis, 692 N.E.2d 325, 336 (11. 1998) (reversed due to the trial court's
erroneous instruction).
28. People v. Wilson, 726 N.E.2d 740, 748 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2000). In People v. Wilson,
the jury asked the trial judge, during deliberations, whether to "perform the act" in a murder case
meant that the accused "actually pull[ed] the trigger" or, instead, that he "participated" in the
killing. Id. at 745. The trial court then gave the jury instructions on accountability, a theory of
liability to which defense counsel's closing statement did not open the door and for which no
evidence supported giving such an instruction. Id. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the
defendant's conviction. Id. at 749; see People v. Jamison, 566 N.E.2d 58, 60 (I11. App. Ct. 3d
Dist. 1991) (finding reversible error where the trial judge responded to a jury communication that
permitted the jurors to convict on an accomplice theory not alleged in the information nor argued
at trial); see also People v. Millsap, 724 N.E.2d 942, 947 (I11. 2000) (holding that giving
accountability instructions after deliberations began runs afoul of a defendant's right to make an
effective closing argument).
29. See, e.g., People v. Cortes, 692 N.E.2d 1129, 1142 (I11.) (holding that the trial court
properly responded to a jury question regarding when the intent to commit a felony must be
formed in relation to a felony murder charge), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 882 (1998).
30. People v. Kinney, 691 N.E.2d 867, 871 (I1. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1998) (determining that
plain error had not occurred where the trial court refused to respond to a jury request in an
aggravated criminal sexual assault trial as to meaning of "force," even though the trial court
should have responded to such a question).
31. People v. Harris, 554 N.E.2d 367, 374 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990) (finding no abuse of
discretion where jury questions reflected confusion on the issues of felony murder and
accountability, and the court directed the jury to consider the murder and accountability
instructions).
32. See People v. Sampson, 408 N.E.2d 3, 7-8 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1980) (reversing a
defendant's conviction where a judge answered a note that did not ask for a review of witness
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judge has no discretion whatsoever to evaluate the strength of the
evidence, or lack thereof, for the benefit of the jury.33 However, merely
because a judge's response is factually consistent with the evidence
presented at trial does not necessarily connote a judge's "stamp of
approval" with the State's position regarding what facts occurred.34
D. Requests for Review of Testimony
It is within the discretion of the trial court to allow or refuse a jury
request to review a transcript of witness testimony,35 or to allow
testimony to be read from a court reporter's notes.36 The trial court is in
the best position to determine if review will help or hurt the jury's
deliberations, and consequently, the trial court's discretion will only be
disturbed where there exists an obvious abuse of discretion. 37 However,
the trial court's assessment as to whether the review will be helpful
must start from the assumption that the jury's request, in and of itself, is
indicative that the jury will find it helpful. 38 In any event, the failure of
the defense to object to the trial court's denial of a jury request for
review of a transcript of testimony may be interpreted as a waiver.39
In cases where a trial court refuses a jury request for a review of
testimony in such a way as to suggest it has no discretion to allow such
testimony but, in effect, for an answer to "what happened"). In People v. Sampson, the judge
answered in a way so as to reflect the version and sequential order of events as told by the
prosecution's witness. Id. at 8. Consequently, the judge's answer usurped the jury's function of
determining the facts and prejudiced the defendant's right to have the jury resolve the factual
issue as to whether the prosecution witness was credible. id.
33. People v. Williams, 322 N.E.2d 819, 825-26 (Ill. 1975) (determining that jury questions
as to: (1) whether a piece of evidence had been fingerprinted; (2) why a window sill in the
victim's home was not fingerprinted; and (3) whether it could examine a police report not
admitted into evidence, were properly refused because the judge does not possess discretion to
offer answers to such questions); People v. Lee, 745 N.E.2d 78, 92-93 (I1. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
2001) (upholding the trial court's direction to the jury to "continue to deliberate," where the jury
questioned the meaning of "legally responsible" and "aiding and abetting," in combination with a
factual hypothetical); People v. Marsan, 637 N.E.2d 540, 543 (11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1994)
(holding that the trial judge's refusal to answer a question regarding whether fingerprints could be
lifted from paper was proper).
34. People v. Kliner, 705 N.E.2d 850, 891-92 (Ill. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 831 (1999)
(upholding the judge's ex parte response to a jury question regarding dates of certain photos as
"Feb. 1998").
35. Id. at 891.
36. People v. Thomas, 730 N.E.2d 618, 627 (Il1. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2000); People v. Pallardy,
417 N.E.2d 851, 854 (Il. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1981).
37. People v. Pierce, 308 N.E.2d 577, 578 (Il1. 1974) (upholding the refusal of a jury request
to review certain witness testimony).
38. People v. Modrowski, 696 N.E.2d 28, 37 (Il. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998); People v. Taylor,
424 N.E.2d 1246, 1252 (I1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1981).
39. People v. Flores, 538 N.E.2d 481, 491 (Ill. 1989).
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review, its refusal will normally constitute reversible error.40  In other
words, the court's refusal must be based on its conclusion that such
review is unwarranted in the case at hand and not on its conclusion that
any review of testimony is inappropriate per se.4 1 Furthermore, some
earlier Illinois case law held that a trial court's refusal to allow the
review of testimony is a proper exercise of its discretion only if the
court had considered the jury's specific request and the reasonableness
thereof.42 A more recent Illinois Supreme Court case, however, held
that where a trial judge, in response to a written request for a transcript,
simply wrote "no" on the bottom of the note, such response did "not
indicate that the denial of the transcripts was based upon the trial
judge's mistaken belief that she had no discretion to provide the
transcripts." 43 Obviously, if the trial court never receives a jury request
for a review of testimony, this will be reversible error per se.44
When the trial court refuses to allow jury review of testimony
because it was "brief' and "uncomplicated," such refusal will be
upheld.45 It would appear that if the trial court believes reexamination
of certain testimony might emphasize certain evidence over other
evidence, that determination may be considered, at least in part, as a
basis to refuse review. 46  Also, where the jury requests portions of a
40. People v. Queen, 310 N.E.2d 166, 169 (I11. 1974) (requiring reversal where the jury asked
for "defendant's words on the stand," and the trial judge responded, "I cannot have any testimony
of any witnesses read to you," because the judge's declaration suggested he thought he was
without authority to allow the jury request).
41. See People v. Autman, 317 N.E.2d 570, 572 (I11. 1974) (reversing the trial court's
summary refusal to allow the jury to review testimony); see also People v. Tansil, 484 N.E.2d
1169, 1173 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1985) (noting that the trial court generally has the discretion to
allow or refuse a jury request to review testimony, but "it is reversible error for a trial court to
refuse to exercise that discretion in the erroneous belief that it has no discretion as to the question
presented").
42. People v. Jackson, 325 N.E.2d 450, 457-58 (III. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1975) (reversing the
defendant's conviction where the trial court failed to make a "preliminary determination" of the
jury's request to review testimony, as the trial judge erroneously believed he had no discretion to
rule on the matter).
43. People v. Kliner, 705 N.E.2d 850, 891 (111. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 830 (1999).
44. People v. Davis, 433 N.E.2d 1376, 1381 (111. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1982) (finding reversible
error per se where the bailiff failed to communicate ajury request to the trial judge).
45. People v. Taylor, 424 N.E.2d 1246, 1252 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1981) (affirming an armed
robbery conviction where the jury request for review of testimony was made only after one and
one-half hours of deliberation, witness testimony was "brief' (no more than three or four hours),
and testimony was "uncomplicated").
46. People v. Singletary, 391 N.E.2d 440, 451 (I11. App. Ct. Ist Dist. 1979) (upholding refusal
to allow the jury to review testimony of only two of the multiple witnesses since the jury might
have "single[d] out" the testimony of the two); accord People v. Page, 350 N.E.2d 262, 263 (II1.
App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1976) (determining that the trial court properly refused to allow the jury to
review four of thirteen witnesses' testimonies).
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witness's testimony, the trial court is not obligated to have all of the
witness testimony repeated.47
Finally, where the jury indicates that a review of testimony is
necessary to reach a verdict, and the trial court in the exercise of its
discretion allows such jury review, the defendant's claim that he was
thereby harmed will rarely be successful.48 The Illinois Appellate
Courts have made reference to other concerns in their evaluation of the
appropriateness of the trial court's decision to allow or deny review of
testimony, including: (1) the length of testimony and whether its reading
would cause unreasonable delay; 49 (2) whether the request for review of
testimony actually involves a request for the trial court's opinion
regarding conflicts in the evidence; 50 (3) whether neither the defendant
nor his attorney was present during the judge/jury exchange; 5 1 and (4)
whether the testimony, which the trial court refused to allow the jury to
reexamine, was inculpatory or exculpatory.
52
47. People v. Reynolds, 373 N.E.2d 650, 653-54 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1978) (finding that a
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted a jury request to read portions of a police
officer's testimony identifying defendants, while refusing the defendants' request that cross-
examination testimony of the officers also be read to the jury); see also People v. Modrowski, 696
N.E.2d 28, 37 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998) (holding that no abuse of discretion had occurred in
allowing the jury to review a witness's prior inconsistent statement placed in evidence, but
refusing to furnish the jury with a copy of the witness's in-court testimony); People v. Creque,
573 N.E.2d 1297, 1303-04 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991) (upholding the trial court's decision to
permit jury review of only the prosecution witnesses' testimony, and allowing review of direct
examination without related cross-examination). But see People v. DeRossett, 604 N.E.2d 500,
515-16 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1992) (allowing a jury to review only a portion of one State
witness's testimony was reversible error).
48. See People v. McClellan, 390 N.E.2d 131, 136 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1979) (upholding the
trial court's allowance of the jury to review testimony when the jury stated it could not reach a
verdict without review of witness testimony because there was no indication as to how the
defendant might have been harmed thereby).
49. People v. Rogers, 442 N.E.2d 529, 533-34 (II1. App. Ct. Ist Dist. 1982) (upholding review
of testimony after noting that the testimony was not lengthy, and therefore, reading it to the jury
would not cause unreasonable delay).
50. People v. Baggett, 450 N.E.2d 913, 917 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1983) (upholding the
refusal to allow review because the jury actually sought the court's opinion regarding evidence
with its request); People v. Bell, 447 N.E.2d 909, 917 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1983) (upholding the
refusal to answer a specific juror question about witness testimony).
51. See People v. Briggman, 316 N.E.2d 121, 125 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1974) (reversing
where the trial court refused to answer a jury question, coupled with the fact that neither the
defendant nor defense counsel was present during the juror communication).
52. People v. Pierce, 308 N.E.2d 577, 578-79 (11. 1974) (holding that it was not error for the
trial court to deny review of witness testimony because the evidence was "unequivocally
incriminating and damaging to the defendant").
2003] Post-Instruction Issues: Jury Deliberations and Verdict 579
E. Requests for Examination of Exhibits/Evidence/Crime Scene
The determination as to whether certain exhibits should be taken to
the jury room is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.53  Of
course, these exhibits must first be admitted into evidence. 54
Impeachment evidence of the alleged criminality, however, may not be
taken to the jury room, even if admitted into evidence. 55 Nonetheless,
the likes of photos of a crime scene, 56 a transcript of a recorded
conversation relating to a drug transaction, as well as the tape recording
itself,57 a defendant's voluntary confession, 58 and physical evidence 59
have been allowed into the jury room. If the trial court sees no purpose
in allowing the item to go to the jury room, however, its refusal will be
upheld. 60
53. People v. Allen, 160 N.E.2d 818, 823 (I1. 1959) (upholding the trial court's decision to
allow a door lock, crowbar, screw driver, and gloves to be taken to the jury room, where all items
were admitted into evidence).
54. People v. Williams, 670 N.E.2d 638, 657 (I11. 1996) (holding that the trial court has no
discretion to allow items not admitted into evidence to go to the jury during deliberations), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1122 (1997); People v. Holcomb, 18 N.E.2d 878, 878-79 (111. 1939)
(determining that reversible error had occurred when the trial court allowed exhibits to be taken
into the jury room when such exhibits were not admitted into evidence); People v. Ramos, 742
N.E.2d 763, 773 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2000) (upholding the trial court's refusal to allow a police
report into the jury room, when such report was not admitted into evidence), cert. denied, 532
U.S. 1073 (2001).
55. People v. Carr, 368 N.E.2d 128, 131 (111. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1977) (finding that prior
inconsistent statements and prior consistent statements taken to jury room, amongst other
problems, gave rise to reversible error). But see People v. Vida, 752 N.E.2d 614, 624 (I11. App.
Ct. 1st Dist. 2001) (holding that plain error had not occurred where a trial court conferred with
counsel for both sides regarding a jury request to see a witness's prior inconsistent written
statement to police, and the defense counsel failed to object to its publication in the jury room);
People v. Herron, 578 N.E.2d 1310, 1320 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1991) (allowing the jury to
review a prior inconsistent statement when the jury was instructed that the statement was not to
be considered as substantive evidence).
56. People v. Diggs, 225 N.E.2d 665, 669 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1967) (allowing a marked
photo of the burglarized premises to be taken into a jury room).
57. People v. Criss, 719 N.E.2d 776, 785-87 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1999) (holding that a trial
court properly allowed a transcript of a recorded conversation to be taken into a jury room, where
a jury request was related to a defendant's predisposition in his claim of entrapment).
58. People v. Hudson, 626 N.E.2d 161, 177 (Ill. 1993) (determining no abuse of discretion had
occurred when a trial court sent a defendant's voluntary confession to capital murder into a jury
room, although not pursuant to ajury request).
59. People v. Watson, 438 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1982) (upholding the
allowance of blood stained panties into a jury room during a trial of a defendant's alleged
indecent liberties with a three-year-old child).
60. People v. Govin, 572 N.E.2d 450, 457 (111. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1991) (refusing a jury
request to permit the replay of tapes of telephone conversations between an informant and
defendant into the jury room, even though such tapes (or transcript of tapes) were played in court,
was proper); People v. Canada, 225 N.E.2d 639, 646 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1967) (upholding a
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Evidence that is admissible should not go into the jury room if its
presence in the jury room would be prejudicial. 61 Merely because
potentially prejudicial evidence is allowed into the jury room, however,
does not always warrant reversal. 62 Most disputes about evidence being
allowed into a jury room center on photographs of homicide victims. In
a murder prosecution, some of the reasons for admitting photos of the
decedent are "to prove the nature and extent of injuries, the position,
condition and location of the body, and the manner and cause of death;
to corroborate a defendant's confession; and to aid in understanding the
testimony of a pathologist or other witness." 63 Once admitted, as with
other evidence, it is within the discretion of the court to permit such
photos to be sent to the jury room .64
Occasionally, a deliberating jury's curiosity may trigger its request to
visit the scene of the alleged crime, A jury request to visit a crime
scene after deliberations have commenced can presumably be denied.
65
F. Questions Unique to Capital Cases (or Questions During
Sentencing Phase)
In a capital case, following the guilt phase of a trial wherein the
accused is convicted of murder, the jury will thereafter consider
court's refusal to allow an anatomical chart to be taken to a jury room in a murder trial because
the jury had unrestricted time to examine the chart immediately prior to retiring to the jury room).
61. People v. Thigpen, 713 N.E.2d 633, 640 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1999) (reversing the trial
court's decision to allow photos into the jury room, where the photos related to the victim of a
separate homicide, even though such "other crimes" evidence was marginally relevant to
establish a common plan or scheme); People v. Lee, 551 N.E.2d 300, 302-03 (Il. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1990) (finding harmless error where the trial court permitted the jury's request to examine
vials of blood, showing that the defendant and the homicide victim had different blood types,
over a defense objection that such vials fed the jury's "ghoulish interest" and raised their passion
because the jury could not have discerned the difference between the vials); see also People v.
Blue, 724 N.E.2d 920, 934 (Il. 2000) (holding that exposing a jury to a headless, torso
mannequin wearing the bloodied and brain-splattered uniform of a deceased police officer killed
in a shooting was prejudicial to the defendant because the admission of such evidence and its
extended period of exposure to the jury outweighed the probative value of the placement and
nature of the officer's injuries, reinforcing the State's claim that the defendant knew he was
shooting at a police officer).
62. People v. Pace, 587 N.E.2d 1257, 1267 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1992) (sending containers of
a victim's blood into a jury room was error, but harmless).
63. People v. Chapman, 743 N.E.2d 48, 69 (Il1. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 956 (2001).
64, Id.; People v. Harris, 695 N.E.2d 447, 465 (Ill. 1998) (affirming the trial court's discretion
to send to a jury photographs depicting a homicide victim's injuries because it depicted at close
range the position of the murder victim in his car when he was shot), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1042
(1998).
65. Cf. People v. Reyes, 439 N.E.2d 1089, 1096 (111. App. Ct. Ist Dist. 1982) (failing to object
to the court's refusal of a jury request to visit a crime scene constitutes the defendant's waiver of
such an argument for purposes of appeal).
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evidence in aggravation and mitigation at a capital sentencing hearing
before it begins its deliberations to determine if the defendant should be
sentenced to death. Naturally, given the gravity of the potential
sanction faced by the accused, more unusual jury questions may be
forthcoming in this type of proceeding. For example, in People v.
Brooks,66 the jury submitted a question during deliberations in the
sentencing phase of a capital sentencing proceeding, asking whether a
defendant sentenced to natural life in prison is always subject to twenty-
three hours-per-day confinement to their cells or, instead, whether such
confinement applied only to inmates on death row. 67 The Illinois
Supreme Court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it answered that death row inmates are so confined, but did not
remind the jury that natural life inmates could also be segregated
twenty-three hours per day.68 In contrast, in People v. Cloutier,69 the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the jury foreman's request for a
chronological order of events, during the State's presentation of
evidence in the aggravation-mitigation stage of a capital sentencing
hearing, amounted to an "innocuous technical violation of the judge's
admonition to refrain from discussing of the case" before being
instructed to begin deliberations because the note did not imply that a
discussion of the evidence had already occurred.7 °
III. JURY CONSIDERATION OF EXTRANEOUS MATTER
Jury consideration of significant extraneous matter or information not
introduced into evidence, which prejudices the accused in the eyes of
the jury, carries a great potential for reversible error. Thus, a reversal
(or mistrial) must be ordered where: (1) the jury or any of its members
gain access to and consider extraneous matter; (2) the matter is
obviously indicative of the defendant's guilt; and (3) it is evident that
the jury was influenced by the matter. 71 While not every instance in
which extraneous or unauthorized information reaches the jury will the
error be considered so prejudicial as to require reversal, if the
66. People v. Brooks, 718 N.E.2d 88 (11. 1999).
67. Id. at 114.
68. Id.
69. People v. Cloutier, 687 N.E.2d 930 (Il1. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 906 (1998).
70. Id. at 938-40.
71. See People v. Holmes, 372 N.E.2d 656, 660 (Ill. 1978) (determining that several jurors'
decisions to visit a Florsheim shoe store to inspect heels of shoes, so as to determine if a shoe
print in the snow at a crime scene matched the defendant's shoe, prejudiced the defendant
because the jurors' "independent investigation" and consideration of "extraneous information"
denied the defendant an opportunity to confront the incriminating information).
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extraneous information improperly brought to the jury's attention "was
in the nature of evidence with which the defendant had not been
confronted at trial and which he had no opportunity to refute," it will be
deemed reversible error.72
In order to demonstrate such prejudice, jurors may be required to
testify at an evidentiary hearing as to the nature of outside influences or
communications, although evidence relating to the effect of such
influences on the mental processes of the jurors is inadmissible. 73 Even
where the matter was brought to the attention of the trial court before
the verdict, the denial of a defendant's motion for a mistrial, where
members of a jury may have been exposed to extraneous influence, will
not be grounds for reversal unless it reasonably appears that at least
some of the jurors were influenced to such an extent that the defendant
was deprived of a fair trial.74 A mistrial, therefore, is not the only
remedy available to the trial court in such a situation. The trial court
may inquire as to the effect of the outside influence, and if it determines
the outside influence will not contaminate the jury's verdict, the inquiry
may be sufficient to resolve the matter.75
In some cases, it appears the court will be willing to presume the
extraneous matter influenced the jury. In People v. Hanson,76 for
example, the jury in an armed robbery trial was allowed to take a coat
belonging to a defendant, which had been introduced into evidence, into
the jury room.77 In the pocket of the coat, the jury discovered currency
that had been cut, though the currency had not been admitted into
evidence. 78 The appellate court ruled that the defendant was said to
have suffered prejudice as a consequence of the jury's consideration of
72. Id.
73. People v. Hobley, 696 N.E.2d 313, 339 (Ill. 1998) (citing Holmes, 372 N.E.2d at 656). In
People v. Hobley, the court remanded the case where a defendant presented several juror
affidavits, which the trial court failed to consider in post-trial hearing, alleging: (1) jurors were
intimidated by non-jurors during their deliberations; (2) jurors were prejudiced by the "expert"
opinion of the jury foreman, a police officer; (3) jurors brought newspapers into the jury room
that contained articles about the case; (4) jurors were subjected to intolerable physical conditions,
including lack of air conditioning and running out of clothes and money while sequestered; and
(5) a number of jurors left their rooms contrary to a sequester order. Id. at 339-43.
74. See People v. Watson, 635 N.E.2d 795, 798-800 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1994) (holding
that a mistrial was not required where, during deliberations, two jurors read newspaper articles
about the case); People v. Morrow, 628 N.E.2d 550, 556-67 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1993)
(upholding the trial court's refusal to order a mistrial after learning that a discharged juror had
informed other jurors that she had received hang-up calls).
75. Morrow, 628 N.E.2d at 556.
76. People v. Hanson, 404 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1980).
77. Id. at 804.
78. Id.
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the cut currency because the currency itself was suggestive that
defendant shared in the robbery proceeds, and the jury might have
believed the cuts in the currency were attributable to defendant's
struggle with a robbery victim who cut him with razor blades.
79
Accordingly, his conviction was reversed on appeal.8°
In contrast to cases where courts have presumed that extraneous
matter has influenced the jury, where the extraneous matter is not
necessarily indicative of a defendant's guilt and it is not evident that it
might have influenced the jury, a claim of prejudice will most likely be
unsuccessful. Thus, where a jury received soup and beverage cups that
reflected written notations such as "SUSPICIOUS PERSONS," "CALL
THE POLICE," "LOCK OUT CRIME," "LOCK YOUR CAR," and
"NEVER GIVE A BURGLAR AN EVEN BREAK" during jury
deliberations following a theft trial, defendant's conviction was
affirmed inasmuch as there was no evidence that the jury gave serious
consideration to the notations or allowed them to influence their
verdict.81 Accordingly, "the probability of prejudice [was] not clearly
evident." 82 In a case such as this, where the jury is still deliberating and
available for individual voir dire, unfair outside influence will be
avoided if the trial court immediately inquires of each juror as to what
effect the extraneous information might have on their deliberations, and
if no influence is apparent, instruct them to disregard the matter in
question.
Where the jury gains access to extraneous matter not itself in
evidence but which refers to a matter in evidence, a claim of prejudice
will have little basis. For instance, a district court held that when
several jurors saw a piece of paper posted outside a courtroom that
listed similar additional charges pending against a defendant, there was
no prejudice since the pending criminal charges had been referred to in
the testimony of a State witness. 83
As to the troublesome area of juror consideration of potentially
prejudicial newspaper articles, either before or during deliberations,
case law suggests a reviewing court is most likely to find reversible
error where the articles implicating defendant either (1) actually
79. Id. at 804-05.
80. Id. at 806.
81. People v. DeBartolo, 322 N.E.2d 251, 257 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1975).
82. Id. at 257-58. In this case, it is important to note that an alert Assistant State's Attorney
promptly inquired of the respective jurors as to whether they were influenced by the notations and
the jurors reported that they were not. Id. at 257. In addition, these notations did not deal
specifically with the defendant or his case. Id. at 258.
83. People v. Eddington, 453 N.E.2d 1383, 1386-88 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1983).
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prejudiced the jury, 84 or (2) potentially prejudiced the jury and the trial
court took no action to guard against the possible outside influence.
85
In assessing whether a defendant had a fair trial, the extent of the
publicity is not as important as what was reported and whether the
jurors were influenced by the publicity. 86 A key question, then, is
whether the jurors are capable of laying aside their opinions, which
have been influenced by publicity surrounding the case, and whether
their assertions that they have such capability satisfies the court.
87
IV. COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE JURY
Beyond the communications between judges and juries considered
above, there are other situations where communications with a jury, by
a judge or others, might arguably contaminate a jury's verdict. As with
"extraneous matter" concerns, the case law in this Part centers on the
issues of whether: (1) the unauthorized communication was considered
by the jury or its members; (2) the communication itself somehow
incriminated the accused; and (3) the communication interfered with the
jury deliberations to the detriment of the accused.
A. Judge's Communication with the Jury
1. General Prohibitions Against Ex Parte Communications
As a general rule, early Illinois case law held it was plain error for a
trial judge to hold any communication about the proceeding with the
jury after they had commenced their deliberation, unless the
communication took place in open court. 88 In 1984, however, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that an unrecorded ex parte
communication between a trial judge and a juror could be harmless
84. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1961) (finding actual prejudice to a defendant
where eight of twelve jurors were convinced the defendant was guilty during voir dire
examination).
85. People v. Cain, 224 N.E.2d 786, 790 (Ill. 1967) (reversing where the trial court failed to
conduct a meaningful examination of a juror who admitted seeing a prejudicial article, did not
instruct the juror not to communicate extraneous matter to other jurors, and did not instruct the
entire jury to disregard such information).
86. People v. Sims, 612 N.E.2d 1011, 1026-27 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1993) (failing to
sequester the jury was not error where the trial court questioned prospective jurors during voir
dire about the publicity of the case and instructed the jury several times to avoid news stories
about the case).
87. People v. Taylor, 462 N.E.2d 478, 482 (Ill. 1984) (citing Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723).
88. See, e.g., People v. Beck, 137 N.E. 454, 456 (Ill. 1922) ("The law is well settled in this
state that it is error for which a judgment will be reversed for a trial judge to hold any
communication with the jury after their retirement to deliberate upon their verdict, except in open
court.").
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error.89 The Court reasoned that "[w]hen an ex parte communication
relates to some aspect of the trial, the trial judge generally should
disclose the communication to counsel for all parties. The prejudicial
effect of a failure to do so, however, can normally be determined by a
post-trial hearing." 90 More recently, the Illinois Supreme Court stated
that it is necessary to show prejudice before a jury verdict will be set
aside because of an unauthorized communication with the jury. 91
The burden is on the State, rather than the defendant, to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that any error in the giving or the substance of an ex
parte response to a jury inquiry is harmless. 92 In capital cases, the no
prejudice or harmless error rule holds true even if a trial court answers
jury questions submitted during deliberations in the sentencing
phase while the defendant was absent. 93  Obviously, an ex parte
89. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117-20 (1983) (per curiam) (holding that communication
could be harmless error in cases where ex pane communication lacked any significance in regard
to the culpability of the accused).
90. Id.
91. People v. Kliner, 705 N.E.2d 850, 890-92 (Ill. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 830 (1999).
In People v. Kliner, the court held that ex pane communication, while violative of constitutional
rights, is harmless error where no harm or prejudice results. Id. at 892. In Kliner, the jury made
six written inquiries that were the subject of an ex parte response: (1) a request for the transcript
of trial, to which the court answered, "no"; (2) the jury's inquiry as to when certain pictures were
taken, to which the court responded, "Feb. 1988"; (3) the jury's announcement. "We are done for
today!," to which the judge did not respond; (4) the jury's statement. "Someone wishes to walk
around block ... to get fresh air and clear their head," to which the court answered, "No, sorry";
(5) the jury's statement, "We are done for today," and the court's response that transportation was
coming and to continue to deliberate; and (6) a note signed by seven jurors complaining about
poor hotel and food, to which the court did not respond. Id. at 891-92; see also People v.
Canaday, 275 N.E.2d 356, 362 (Ill. 1971) (finding no prejudice had occurred where the
communication regarded when the jury was to appear).
92. People v. Childs, 636 N.E.2d 534, 538-40 (I11. 1994) (reversing the defendant's conviction
where the trial judge, while dining in a restaurant with an Assistant State's Attorney on the case,
was informed that the jury had questions about the instructions (that were in fact erroneous), and
the trial judge told the bailiff to tell the jury to follow the original erroneous instructions that were
already given); People v. Ross, 709 N.E.2d 621, 628-29 (Il. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1999) (finding
reversible error where the trial court made an ex parte inquiry of the jury, outside the presence of
defense counsel, as to whether they could reach a verdict that evening); People v. Comage, 709
N.E.2d 244, 246 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1999) (determining that reversible error occurred when
the trial court violated a defendant's right to be present and to have a fair trial by responding "no"
to a jury request to define "knowingly" in a jury instruction, without informing the defendant or
his counsel); People v. Oden, 633 N.E.2d 1385, 1390 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1994) (finding
reversible error where the trial court failed to answer a jury query regarding what constituted
"constructive possession," where an unlawful use of weapons charge involved the alleged
possession of a weapon, and a supplemental instruction was given outside the presence of the
defendant and his counsel). But see People v. Crockett, 731 N.E.2d 823, 834-36 (I11. App. Ct. I st
Dist. 2000) (holding that it was clear error for the trial court to fail to inform defendant of a jury
question regarding the definition of "abet," but the error was harmless).
93. People v. Brooks, 718 N.E.2d 88, 114-15 (Il. 1999) (holding that even though the capital
defendant was absent during the trial court's response to jury questions during jury deliberations
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communication between a juror and a judge will not constitute prejudice
if the communications had nothing to do with the defendant's alleged
criminal liability.94  Furthermore, the current technological age may
significantly contribute to the avoidance of ex parte communication
problems. In an Illinois Appellate Court opinion, a trial court's use of a
telephone to contact the parties for purposes of determining a response
to a jury question has been held in certain circumstances not to be an ex
parte communication. 9
5
2. Inquiry into the Numerical Division of a Jury
It is error for a trial court to inquire into the numerical division of a
jury on the theory that it may subtly coerce jurors, particularly those not
in agreement with the majority, to reach a verdict.96  Such an inquiry,
in the sentencing phase, there was no prejudice where defense counsel expressed all the concerns
the defendant could have expressed had he been present), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1039 (2000);
People v. McDonald, 660 N.E.2d 832, 849-51 (II1. 1995) (upholding a defendant's conviction
despite the trial court's improper ex parte communication to the jury in the sentencing phase of a
capital murder trial, which refused to answer the jury's question about mitigating evidence and
directed the jury to rely on the original instructions that were readily understandable and
sufficiently explained the law, as the communication was harmless error); People v. Johnson, 585
N.E.2d 78, 96-97 (I11. 1991) (determining that although the trial judge's failure to inform the
parties of a jury request during deliberations in the aggravation-mitigation phase was "highly
improper," where the jury was requesting DSM-II-R and the psychiatric expert's reports, the
communication was harmless error because these documents were never admitted into evidence
and, as such, could not have been delivered to the deliberating jury), cer denied, 506 U.S. 834
(1992). But see People v. Walker, 440 N.E.2d 83, 90 (I11. 1982) (reversing where the cumulative
effect of a trial court's error, including an ex parte response to a jury question during the
sentencing stage regarding whether a defendant would be eligible for parole, was prejudicial).
94. People v. Steidl, 568 N.E.2d 837, 847-48 (111. 1991) (informing the jury when dinner
would be brought and when sequestration would occur was not prejudicial even though the
communication was ex parte); People v. Veal, 374 N.E.2d 963, 985-86 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1978) (holding that a jury communication through the bailiff to the judge regarding concerns
about personal safety in the hotel where jurors were sequestered, a juror's communication
regarding a death in the family, several jurors' statements that too much time was being wasted,
and a juror's question about another juror's remark during the testimony of a witness were not
prejudicial inasmuch as all remarks were reported to the parties by the judge and none "had any
bearing on the merits of the criminal trial").
95. People v. Smith, 747 N.E.2d 1081, 1088-89 (Ill. App. Ct. Ist Dist. 2001) (affirming a
conviction where a trial court contacted the defense counsel, who in turn talked to the defendant
on a private phone, and the dialogue with the judge, with the Assistant State's Attorney present,
resolved the problem without objection from defense regarding procedure).
96. People v. Roman, 618 N.E.2d 786, 788 (11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1993) (reversing where the
trial court inquired into the numerical breakdown of the jury on four different occasions); accord
People v. Sanchez, 422 N.E.2d 58, 61-62 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1981). Contra People v. Griggs,
467 N.E.2d 397, 400-01 (I11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1984) (finding that although error had occurred,
such error was not reversible error because there was no indication that the inquiry interfered with
jury deliberations). But see Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450 (1926) (holding that
because the inquiry into numerical division of the jury is "coercive," the "inquiry itself' should be
regarded as grounds for reversal). In People v. Kirk, 394 N.E.2d 1212, 1217-18 (Ill. App. Ct. Ist
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however, is most often harmless error.97 It is only prejudicial if the
numerical division inquiry is determined to be somehow coercive. 98
Therefore, when a trial court receives an unsolicited statement from the
jury that reflects the numerical division of the jurors and then orders the
jurors to keep deliberating, there is no error.99
3. "Coercing" a Verdict
Closely intertwined with the "inquiry into the numerical division"
and "deadlocked jury" concerns (discussed below) are defense claims
that a judge's communication tended to "coerce" the jury into reaching
a verdict. In People v. Santiago,100 the following occurred:
Twice the trial judge improperly asked for the numerical division of
the jury and the second inquiry, which reflected an eleven to one split,
was made after the judge already knew that the jury had divided eight
to four in favor of returning a verdict of guilty; immediately after he
first discovered that the jury was divided in favor of a verdict of
guilty, the trial judge gave the jury a Prim instruction which, inter alia,
urged the jurors to reach an agreement; on the fourth day of
deliberations the jury was called into court three times at the insistence
of the judge who repeatedly questioned the foreman regarding the
state of deliberations; over the course of the deliberations the foreman
indicated that the jury was deadlocked and that further deliberations
might not help. By virtue of the trial court's actions in this case, the
jury may well have believed that the court concurred with the majority
and that deliberations would continue until a unanimous verdict of
guilty was returned. Such a verdict cannot be said to have been
reached without improper prodding from a trial court and should not
be allowed to stand. 10 1
Dist. 1979), the Illinois Appellate Court held that the United States v. Brasfield holding is not
constitutionally binding because the decision was only based on an exercise of the United States
Supreme Court's supervisory power, and, accordingly, such inquiries can constitute harmless
error.
97. See, e.g., People v. Golub, 165 N.E. 196, 199 (I1. 1929); People v. Eppinger, 688 N.E.2d
325, 329-30 (111. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1998); People v. Schaff, 618 N.E.2d 566, 569-70 (111. App. Ct.
1st Dist. 1993); People v. lozzo, 552 N.E.2d 1308, 1314 (11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1990).
98. See infra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing a situation where a court's inquiry
was held to be coercive).
99. People v. Watkins, 688 N.E.2d 798, 806 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1997).
100. People v. Santiago, 439 N.E.2d 984 (I1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1982).
101. Id. at 997-98 (emphasis added). But cf Golub, 165 N.E. at 199 (finding error, but not
reversible error, where a trial court asked about the jury's numerical division, learned it was 9-3,
and thereafter stated that the jury "ought not to have any difficulty in reaching a verdict on th[e]
evidence"); People v. Green, 415 N.E.2d 595, 598-99 (II. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1980) (inquiring into
the numerical division of the jury, without the breakdown on guilt or innocence, giving a Prim
instruction that deleted reference to an individual juror's duty to decide the case for himself, and
sequestering the jury for the night after eleven hours of deliberation, and after ten members
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Any judicial intervention into the jury's deliberations in which the court
informs the jury of the consequences of the failure to reach a verdict by
a certain time can be coercive. 10 2 Some decisions state that merely
informing the jury that it will be sequestered if it fails to reach a verdict
after a certain time can be coercive, although whether such
communication will be found to be coercive depends on the length of
time that the jury deliberates before it returns with a guilty verdict. 10 3
Other decisions hold that where the possibility of sequestration is not
presented in a "threatening manner," there is no coercion. 104
If the court, in effect, forces the jury to arrive at a verdict at all costs,
this will be reversible error. 10 5 In one case, coercion and prejudicial
error occurred based on the judge's following comment to the jury:
There is no reason at all why this jury cannot arrive at verdicts in this
case. I repeat, I don't care what your verdict is, but you can't be
deadlocked. You heard one day of evidence and it is a question of you
either believe one side or you believe the other. You can't be
deadlocked. 10 6
There is not necessarily coercion or error merely because a judge asks
the jury if it can reach a verdict within a certain time frame, however,
lest the judge be required to sequester the jury overnight, 10 7 or because
he or she advises the jury that it will be allowed to deliberate only for a
informed the court they did not believe additional deliberation would lead to verdict, did not give
rise to prejudice). For a discussion of People v. Prim, 289 N.E.2d 601 (Il1. 1972), see infra Part
V.A.
102. People v. Ross, 709 N.E.2d 621, 630 (Il1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1999) (containing extensive
discussion of "coerced" verdicts case law).
103. Id. (reversing where the trial court interrupted deliberations, wherein the court asked the
jury if it could reach a verdict that evening and the jury responded "yes," because the jury's return
of a verdict within fifteen minutes was the result of coercion); People v. Friedman, 494 N.E.2d
760, 765 (11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1986) (reversing defendant's conviction where the jury returned a
verdict within five minutes of being told they would be sequestered, because the trial court's
communication amounted to coercion).
104. People v. Morales, 666 N.E.2d 839, 845-46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1996); accord People
v. Fields, 675 N.E.2d 180, 186-87 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1996) (determining that the trial court's
statement that transportation was coming did not coerce a guilty verdict); People v. Saldana, 496
N.E.2d 757, 765-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1986) (informing the jury that it may be sequestered
was not coercive).
105. Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446 (1965) (per curiam) (finding coercion where
the judge told the jury, "You have got to reach a decision in this case").
106. People v. Robertson, 416 N.E.2d 323, 324-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1981).
107. People v. Sanders, 345 N.E.2d 757, 760-61 (Il1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1976) (holding that no
coercion had occurred where the trial court asked if the jury was capable of reaching a verdict in
the next forty five minutes). But see Ross, 709 N.E.2d at 630 (reversing as coercive where an ex
parte inquiry as to whether the jury could reach a verdict that evening had occurred during trial).
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limited time. 10 8 Similarly, it is not reversible error when a judge states
that "a verdict had to be reached by 11 p.m. or everybody would be
going home," because that remark could be interpreted to mean that the
jury would simply resume deliberations the next morning. 109
In cases such as People v. Gregory1 10 where a judge's interaction
with a jury somehow suggests the judge is informing jurors to heed the
majority at all costs before they have rendered a final verdict, such
judicial coercion will trigger a reversal."' In Gregory, a bailiff, while
in open court, advised the judge that the jury had a verdict, while the
judge simultaneously examined and read into the record a jury note
which said, "If the record is split on one charge, how do we fill out the
guilty forms: guilty; not guilty? Both forms or one?" 112 The bailiff
insisted the jury had a verdict, whereupon the judge concluded he did
not have to answer the question. 113 The judge then asked the jury if
they had reached a verdict, to which they responded in the
affirmative. 114  As the judge examined the verdict forms, he stated
"guilty" on the two charges at issue, whereupon the jury told him to
examine the forms more carefully. 115 The judge repeated that the
verdict was "guilty," whereupon a juror said the judge should examine
the other form. 116 Now realizing that ten jurors had signed the guilty
forms and two the not guilty forms, he responded, "Oh, Lord."' 117 At
that point, the judge gave the jury a supplemental instruction saying
there were not "enough" signatures on the guilty verdict form, returned
the same forms, and ordered them to continue to deliberate. 1 8 After an
hour, the jury returned the guilty verdict forms with twelve signatures,
while the not guilty signatures were scratched out. 119 The appellate
court ruled that the jury could have concluded that (1) the judge's
"inattention to the detail of the verdict forms was born of his
expectation that the jury would return such guilty verdicts" and his "Oh,
Lord" comment suggested that something had gone "awry," and (2) his
108. People v. Duszkewycz, 189 N.E.2d 299, 301-02 (I11. 1963) (holding that no coercion had
occurred where the jury reached a verdict after being given one more hour to deliberate).
109. People v. Gregorich, 389 N.E.2d 619, 621-22 (I11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1979).
110. People v. Gregory, 540 N.E.2d 854, 859 (111. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1989).
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 855.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 856.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
supplemental instruction that there were not "enough" signatures and
his return of the same verdict forms, rather than replacing them with
new ones, was a veiled suggestion that the two holdouts should "heed
the majority."' 120 Thus, the trial judge's actions required a reversal. 12 1
Another illustration of a trial judge's conduct that was considered
coercive is People v. Katalinich.122 In Katalinich, the defendant was
charged with three counts of aggravated battery. 123 The judge provided
the jury with three sets of verdict forms for the aggravated battery
counts and three more sets for the included offenses of battery. 124 After
deliberating, the jury stated it had reached a verdict. 125 The jury found
defendant not guilty of either aggravated battery or battery of alleged
victim number one but guilty of battery of victims number two and
three. 126 The aggravated battery verdict forms, however, were blank for
victims two and three. 127 The trial judge did not inquire as to why the
latter forms were blank but rather told the jury it "must" return to the
jury room to complete the blank verdict forms. 128 When the jury
returned, the verdict forms reflected guilty verdicts for aggravated
battery. 129 The appellate court concluded that the jury may well have
been hung on the aggravated battery counts, which explained the blank
forms, and that telling it that it "must" return to the jury room and
"must" complete the forms coerced a verdict.130
B. Communications with a Jury by Other Persons
Where an individual in an official capacity communicates
information that may influence the jury's decision regarding the
defendant's liability, or coerces the jury to reach a verdict, prejudice is a
clear possibility.131 Further, any third-party communication with a juror
120. Id. at 858-60.
121. Id. at 860.
122. People v. Katalinich, 506 N.E.2d 356 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1987).
123. Id. at 356.
124. Id. at 357.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 359-60.
131. See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 363-66 (1966) (per curiam) (holding that the
bailiff's statement to the jury that defendant was guilty, and "'if there [was] anything wrong the
Supreme Court [would] correct it,"' gave rise to "such a probability [of] prejudice" that a
defendant's right to due process was violated); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 150-52
(1892) (requiring reversal where a bailiff allegedly told a jury that a defendant had killed two
other men and had attempted to commit another crime during the trial); United States ex rel. Tobe
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during trial about a matter pending before the jury is presumptively
prejudicial, and, as such, the burden rests upon the State to establish
such contact was harmless. 132  Where the third-party communication
during deliberations has no relationship to the defendant's possible
guilt, however, the communication will ordinarily not be considered
erroneous and prejudicial. 133
V. DEADLOCKED JURY: PRIM INSTRUCTION AND MISTRIAL ORDERS
A. General Concerns
In Allen v. United States,134 the United States Supreme Court
approved the so-called Allen charge directed to deadlocked juries,
which encouraged jurors voting in the minority to give "proper regard
and deference to the opinions of each other," consider their "duty" to
reach a verdict, and if possible, heed the majority. 135 Noting that the
Allen charge had been "severely criticized" and "discouraged or
prohibited in certain jurisdictions," in People v. Prim,136 the Illinois
Supreme Court approved the so-called Prim charge which deleted the
v. Bensinger, 492 F.2d 232, 238 (7th Cir. 1974) (affirming the district court's granting of habeas
corpus relief where the bailiff's communication to the jury that "'[y]ou must reach a decision'
was "presumptively prejudicial," and had to be rebutted by evidence that the communication was
harmless); People v. Kawoleski, 145 N.E. 203, 203-04 (I11. 1924) (finding reversible error had
occurred where the sheriff in charge of the jury stated that "it should not take more than two or
three minutes to convict").
132. People v. Burns, 709 N.E.2d 672, 676 (I11. App. Ct. Ist Dist. 1999) (holding that a
conversation between a juror and the defendant's family was harmless).
133. People v. Rettig, 278 N.E.2d 781, 781-82 (I11. 1972) (affirming a defendant's conviction
despite a sheriff's two or three minute conversation with the jury about a noon meal and another
matter no one could recall because the communication was "highly imprudent" but not
prejudicial); People v. Mills, 237 N.E.2d 697, 703 (111. 1968) (finding no error or prejudice where
a juror asked the bailiff if he could ask the bailiff some questions, and the bailiff responded in the
negative); People v. Cart, 429 N.E.2d 553, 563-64 (Il1. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1981) (holding that
there was no indication that an apparently drunken bailiffs call to a juror, inquiring about the
outcome of deliberations, followed by a juror remark that the jury would reconvene the next
morning, was prejudicial); People v. Martinez, 360 N.E.2d 495, 496-98 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1977) (affirming a defendant's conviction where one juror said, "Hello" to the trial attorney, and
the attorney responded, "Hello. I wish I could say something to you but I can't." Thereafter,
another juror approached and told the attorney, "You must have done something fight.., we're
all tied up," and the attorney responded "Oh, really?"); People v. Trejo, 352 N.E.2d 68, 76 (II1.
App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1976) (determining that there was no indication that the bailiffs remarks to the
jury coerced or hastened the verdict, or were otherwise prejudicial to defendant).
134. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
135. Id. at 501.
136. People v. Prim, 289 N.E.2d 601 (I11. 1972).
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"heed the majority" suggestion of Allen. 137  The Court gave the
following instruction:
The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror.
In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree
thereto. Your verdict must be unanimous.
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to
deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so
without violence to individual judgment. Each of you must decide the
case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the
evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations,
do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion
if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest
conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the
opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a
verdict.
You are not partisans. You are judges-judges of the facts. Your
sole interest is to ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case.
138
Although the instruction itself is no longer challenged, other claims
have been raised that relate to the problem of a potentially deadlocked
jury. These claims will now be explored.
B. Claims that the Prim Instruction Is Premature
Earlier Illinois cases held that it was premature to give a Prim
instruction if there was no indication that the jury was deadlocked. 139
However, later cases ruled that a Prim instruction could be given even
before deliberations. 140 Today, it is clearly up to the trial court's broad
discretion whether to give such an instruction and, accordingly, when to
give the instruction. 14 1  Such a determination is dependent upon the
137. Id. at 607, 609-10.
138. Id. at 609.
139. People v. Jackson, 325 N.E.2d 450, 458-59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1975) (reversing the
trial court's decision to give a Prim instruction after ten hours of deliberation because the jury
foreperson advised the judge they would reach verdict).
140. People v. Preston, 391 N.E.2d 359, 363-64 (i11. 1979) (dictum) (citing People v. Viser,
343 N.E.2d 903, 912 (Ill. 1975) (Allen charge; pre-Prim trial)).
141. People v. Chapman, 743 N.E.2d 48, 70-71 (Ill. 2000) (upholding the trial court's refusal
to give an instruction where the defense requested the instruction to be given before deliberations
began), cert denied, 533 U.S. 956 (2001); People v. Douglas, 567 N.E.2d 544, 549-50 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1st Dist. 1991) (affirming the trial court's refusal to provide a Prim instruction even though
the court was informed that the jury was deadlocked); see also People v. Dortch, 441 N.E.2d 100,
106 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1982) (holding that the delivery of Prim instructions to a jury that was
not deadlocked was not prejudicial despite the fact that the defendant was found guilty forty-five
minutes later); People v. McNeal, 419 N.E.2d 460, 463-64 (Il. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1981)
(upholding the trial court's decision to give Prim instructions to prospective jurors during voir
dire and again after all the evidence was presented).
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circumstances of each case, including the amount of deliberation time
already spent and the difficulty of the issues before the jury. 142 Merely
because the jury returns a guilty verdict soon after the Prim instruction
cannot be used as a basis for concluding that the verdict was per se
coerced. 143
C. Variations from Prim
Supplemental instructions, which include mention of the necessity of
a new trial if no verdict is reached, are not reversible error despite
Prim's disapproval of the same. 144  So too, instructions that delete any
reference to the individual juror's duty to decide the case for himself is
not necessarily cause for reversal. 145 It should be mentioned, however,
that variations from Prim have, by and large, received a cool reception
from the appellate courts, although they have not always been deemed
cause for reversal. 146 Of course, advising the jury that it must reach a
verdict will constitute reversible error. 147  Another basis for reversal
will arise where the Prim instruction is given along with an inquiry as to
whether the jury can reach a verdict without regard to the death penalty.
This procedure implicitly suggests to the jury that the judge is of the
opinion that the defendant is guilty.148
142. Chapman, 743 N.E.2d at 70-71 (upholding a refusal to give Prim instruction before
deliberation began); Preston, 391 N.E.2d at 363 (finding that Prim instructions that were given
after six hours of deliberation were not premature).
143. People v. Martinez, 611 N.E.2d 1027, 1037-38 (1I1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1993) (finding that
the jury was not coerced because it reached a verdict fifteen minutes after the Prim instruction
was given); People v. Hugues, 595 N.E.2d I, 7 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991) (denying coercion
after the jury reached a verdict fifty minutes after the Prim instruction was given).
144. Preston, 391 N.E.2d at 364.
145. People v. Green, 415 N.E.2d 595, 598 (111. App. Ct. lst Dist. 1980).
146. See People v. Bibbs, 428 N.E.2d 965. 971-72 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1981) (holding that
Prim should have been followed, but variant instruction was not reversible error).
147. People v. Ferro, 551 N.E.2d 1378, 1385-86 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1990) (finding that the
statement, "If you are not going to be able to reach a verdict, I am going to house you in a local
motel somewhere until this jury does reach a verdict," conveyed to jurors the idea that they must
reach a verdict, and as such, constituted coercing a verdict and reversible error); People v.
Robertson, 416 N.E.2d 323, 324-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1981) (finding that the statement, "I
don't care what your verdict is, but you can't be deadlocked," was reversible error); People v.
Pankey, 374 N.E.2d 1114, 1115-17 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1978) (reading to jury "A New Judge's
Creed" and stating, "There is no such thing as a hung judge-you will now retire to determine
your verdict," was reversible error because the statement strongly suggested that there is no such
thing as a hung jury).
148. People v. Baltimore, 288 N.E.2d 659, 665-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1972) (holding that a
judge's submission of an interrogatory to the jury after many hours of deliberation, which asked
whether a verdict could be reached without regard to imposing the death penalty, may have been
misconstrued by the jury and was plain error on the part of the judge).
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In addition, where a jury is having difficulty reaching an agreement,
reversal exists where the trial court directs critical remarks at a
particular juror. For example, in People v. Branch,149 after twenty-four
hours of deliberation, the jury foreperson sent a note to the judge
indicating a particular juror could not bring himself to vote guilty since
"they" could not put anyone in jail and had, from the beginning, stated
"they" were uncomfortable serving on the jury. 150 Without discussing
the note with counsel, the judge acknowledged the jury's "dilemma,"
commented that the juror in question "evidently should not have
received jury service," and further stated that this jury's responsibility
would not be "cut ... short" because of the dilemma. 151 The judge
instructed the jury pursuant to Prim and directed the jury to deliberate
further. 152  The jury later returned with a guilty verdict. 153  The
appellate court reversed, stating that the judge's remarks had the "effect
of intimidating the juror into changing his vote by implying that his
refusal to defer to the majority position should have disqualified him
from jury service." 154
Finally, the judge is under no responsibility to tell the jury that they
could be discharged without reaching a verdict. 155 Indeed, the Illinois
Supreme Court strongly disfavors informing a jury about the possibility
of a mistrial stating, "To inform the jury that its inability to reach a
verdict might be grounds for a mistrial would not aid in its given task,
but rather would tend only to complicate the deliberations, making that
task even more difficult." 156
D. Claims that a Mistrial Order Should Have
or Should Not Have Been Granted
In a jury trial, the length of jury deliberations and the point at which a
mistrial order is warranted is a matter within the discretion of the trial
149. People v. Branch, 462 N.E.2d 868 (II1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1984).
150. id. at 872.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 869.
154. Id. at 873-74.
155. People v. Allen, 365 N.E.2d 460, 464 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1977).
156. Id. at 467; see People v. Prim, 289 N.E.2d 601, 610 (111. 1972) ("[T]elling a jury that if
they fail to agree on a verdict the case must be retried is not correct."); see also People v. Pulliam,
680 N.E.2d 343, 354-55 (II1.) (holding that the trial court properly refused to answer a jury
question during capital sentencing deliberations, as to "what happens if we cannot reach a
unanimous decision on either verdict," while directing the jury to continue deliberating), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 921 (1997).
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court. 157 How long the jury will be required to deliberate after the Prim
instruction is given is also within the broad discretion of the trial
court. 158  In cases where the jury advises the trial court at some point
that it is "deadlocked and cannot see any possibility of reaching a
verdict," the court is not required to order a mistrial and, accordingly,
can order deliberations to continue. 159  This is particularly true where
the jury deliberates briefly before declaring that unanimity is
impossible. 160 Thus, the amount of time spent in deliberations, whether
a jury should continue deliberations after it has indicated it is
deadlocked, and whether to sequester a jury that has stated on more than
one occasion that it cannot reach a verdict are all matters within the
clear discretion of the trial court. 161 Furthermore, there is no fixed time
a jury must deliberate before a judge determines the jury is deadlocked
and orders a mistrial, and, as such, a trial judge enjoys "great latitude"
in the exercise of this discretion. 162 Thus, if a jury is dismissed after
only several hours have passed, the dismissal will not be considered an
abuse of discretion where it appears as though the jury was unable to
reach a verdict. 163
VI. SEQUESTRATION OF THE JURY DURING DELIBERATIONS
One way to avoid jury bias resulting from media publicity or other
outside influences is to sequester the jury. Prior to 1997, trial courts
were required to keep the jury together and not allow them to separate
during deliberations prior to rendering a verdict. 164 The decision to
157. People v. Daily, 242 N.E.2d 170, 172 (Ill. 1968) (finding no abuse of discretion for the
trial court to require the jury to return to deliberating after six and one half hours of deliberation,
where the trial lasted four days, numerous witnesses were examined, and testimony was
conflicting).
158. People v. Kirk, 394 N.E.2d 1212, 1218 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1979).
159. Allen, 365 N.E.2d at 464; accord People v. Cowan, 473 N.E.2d 1307, 1309 (I11. 1985);
People v. Douglas, 567 N.E.2d 544, 550 (Il1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991); People v. Dungy, 461
N.E.2d 485, 491-92 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1984); People v. Bravos, 252 N.E.2d 776, 783-84 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1969).
160. See, e.g., People v. Kegley, 590 N.E.2d 922, 930-31 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1992) (noting
that a jury declared that it could not reach a verdict after one and one-half hours of deliberation).
161. People v. Harris, 691 N.E.2d 80, 85 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1988).
162. People v. Preston, 391 N.E.2d 359, 363 (I11. 1979).
163. People v. Mays, 179 N.E.2d 654, 656 (I11. 1962) (four hours); People v. Cooper, 483
N.E.2d 309, 314-15 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1985) (nine hours).
164. See People v. Ritzert, 308 N.E.2d 636, 637-39 (II1. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1974); 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/115-4(m) (2000). Section 115-4(m) of the Illinois Compiled Statutes states:
In the trial of a capital or other offense, any juror who is a member of a panel or jury
which has been impaneled and sworn as a panel or as a jury shall be permitted to
separate from other such jurors during every period of adjournment to a later day, until
final submission of the cause to the jury for the determination, except that no such
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sequester the jury during trial, prior to deliberations, however, was
within the sound discretion of the trial court. 165  Effective in 1997,
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 436 provides that sequestration during
deliberations is no longer mandatory. Specifically, Rule 436 provides:
(a) In criminal cases, either before or after submission of the cause
to the jury for determination, the trial court may, in its discretion, keep
the jury together in the charge of an officer of the court, or the court
may allow the jurors to separate temporarily outside the presence of a
court officer, overnight, on weekends, on holidays, or in emergencies.
(b) The jurors shall, whether permitted to separate or kept in charge
of officers, be admonished by the trial court that it is their duty (1) not
to converse with anyone else on any subject connected with the trial
until they are charged; (2) not to knowingly read or listen to outside
comments or news accounts of the procedure until they are
discharged; (3) not to discuss among themselves any subject
connected with the trial, or form or express any opinion on the cause
until it is submitted to them for deliberation; and (4) not to view the
place where the offense was allegedly committed. 166
While there is a scarcity of Illinois cases on the issue, those cases that
discuss discretionary sequestration during trial may offer guidance as to
how Rule 436 will be applied.
The usual basis for ordering a sequestering of the jury during the
course of the trial is to achieve insulation of the jury from prejudicial
media reports. So long as the trial court has properly admonished the
jury to disregard extraneous matter, not discuss the matter with anyone,
and there is no showing of actual prejudice to the defendant, however,
separation shall be permitted in any trial after the court, upon motion by the defendant
or the State or upon its own motion, finds a probability that prejudice to the defendant
or to the State will result from such separation.
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-4(m).
165. People v. Saltz, 393 N.E.2d 1292, 1294 (Il1. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1979).
166. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 436. See Committee Comments on the Illinois Supreme Court Rule
436, which state the following:
This proposed rule is intended to allow jurors to go home for an evening, weekend,
holiday, or emergency and dispense with the need to accommodate the jurors in a hotel
overnight, even if the cause has been submitted to them for final deliberation. The
Code of Criminal Procedure presently requires "an officer of the court * * * to keep
[jurors] together and prevent conversation between the jurors and others" (except
interpreters), after final submission of the cause to the jury for determination. 725
ILCS 5/115-4. This proposed rule provides that in appropriate cases, jurors may
separate temporarily after being admonished with regard to their duties. It does away
with the blanket requirement that they be sequestered and guarded.
Id. comm. cmt.
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the failure to sequester will not constitute reversible error. 167  The
decision not to sequester a jury is within the sound discretion of the trial
court.
An after-the-fact consideration of the appropriateness of the judge's
decision not to sequester is not dependent on the correctness of the trial
court's decision when examined in retrospect, but rather "whether upon
the record as a whole the defendant received a trial before a fair and
impartial jury."' 168 In any event, a reviewing court will be prompted to
conclude that the accused suffered no actual prejudice if (1) the media
gave the matter limited coverage, 169 (2) the defense did not challenge
any jurors during voir dire for cause because of the publicity, 170 (3) the
defense exercised none of its peremptory challenges, 17 1 (4) a
considerable lapse of time existed between the commission of the crime
and the trial, 172 and (5) the trial court was diligent in insuring that a fair
and impartial jury free of prior prejudices was selected. 173
The decision to sequester is likewise within the sound discretion of
the trial court. 1 7 4 For example, a trial court's order to sequester jurors
so as to avoid possible threats to the jury, after the jury learned about
the vandalism of an excused juror's son's automobile, was upheld as
proper. 175 It is fair, then, to assume the appellate courts will be quite
deferential regarding whether sequestration during deliberations should
have occurred. Presumably, so long as the trial court properly
admonishes the jury, as Rule 436 requires, the decision to sequester or
not to sequester during deliberations will be upheld.
VII. JUROR NOTE TAKING
Whether jurors should be permitted to take notes, and refer to their
notes during deliberations, is a matter of controversy. Some studies
167. People v. Brisbon, 478 N.E.2d 402, 407 (111. 1985); People v. Yonder, 256 N.E.2d 321,
328 (Il1. 1969): People v. Sims, 612 N.E.2d 1011, 1027 (I11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1993); People v.
Knippenberg, 388 N.E.2d 806, 810 (111. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1979).
168. Yonder, 256 N.E.2d at 328.
169. Saltz, 393 N.E.2d at 1294 (finding that a juror who had seen a single prejudicial article
while not sequestered did not contaminate the jury).
170. Yonder, 256 N.E.2d at 327 (finding that forty-four out of one hundred eleven prospective
jurors had not seen any pretrial publicity, and none of the jurors were challenged for cause).
171. People v. Brinn, 204 N.E.2d 724, 727 (I11. 1965) (finding that a lack of challenges was
strong evidence that impartial jury was possible after voir dire).
172. Knippenberg, 388 N.E.2d at 810 (trial took place more than five years after offense and
lapse of time can dissipate feelings of prejudice in the community).
173. Id. at 809.
174. People v. Bolla, 448 N.E.2d 996, 1002-03 (II1. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1983).
175. Id. at 1003--04.
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suggest note taking may aid jurors in their recollection of evidence
presented at trial. 176 Many courts, however, are skeptical, suggesting
that jurors may attach undue weight to their notes, which may be
inaccurate or misleading, rather than their own personal recollection. 177
Some courts outside of Illinois may place restrictions on their use, such
as instructing jurors that they may take notes for their own use but may
not share them with other jurors during deliberations. 178 Illinois has
specific legislation on the subject in the Code of Criminal Procedure:
The members of the jury shall be entitled to take notes during the trial,
and the sheriff of the county in which the jury is sitting shall provide
them with writing materials for this purpose. Such notes shall remain
confidential, and shall be destroyed by the sheriff after the verdict has
been returned or a mistrial declared. 179
The juror note taking provision is mandatory, and, as such, a trial
judge cannot prohibit jurors from taking notes. 180 However, such error
may be deemed harmless where the evidence against the accused was
overwhelming. 181 In addition, where a defendant fails to object to such
a prohibition, and the attorneys agree, the matter is waived. 182 While
there are no criminal cases in Illinois addressing this issue, one civil
case has held that an attorney has no right during argument to tell the
jury to take notes of certain information conveyed. 183
VIII. TAKING THE JURY VERDICT
A. Polling of the Jury
The polling of a jury after verdict, so as to ascertain if the verdict is a
true reflection of each individual juror's choice, has been deemed a
"substantial right."'184 There is no requirement that a juror's response
176. E.g., David L. Rosenhan et al., Notetaking Can Aid Juror Recall, 18 LAW & HUM.
BEHAv. 53, 59-61 (1994).
177. See, e.g., People v. Morales, 559 N.Y.S.2d 869, 869 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding that
note taking during supplemental charge over objections of counsel and prosecutor deprived a
defendant of a fair trial).
178. Johnson v. State, 887 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
179. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-4(n) (2000). Notably, there is no case law interpreting the
"shall remain confidential" language and what it means.
180. People v. Strong, 653 N.E.2d 938, 941-43 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1995).
181. Id. at 943.
182. People v. Layhew, 564 N.E.2d 1232, 1240 (Il. 1990).
183. Ettelsohn v. Kirkwood, 33 111. App. 103, 103 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1889).
184. People v. Herron, 332 N.E.2d 623, 624 (II1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1975) (citing to three cases
in support of finding that polling a jury after a verdict is a "substantial right": People v.
Townsend, 284 N.E.2d 414 (11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1972); People v. DeStefano, 212 N.E.2d 357
(Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1965); Nomaque v. People, 1 111. 145 (1825)).
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be in any specific form, and the principal question is "whether the court,
upon hearing the juror's response, reasonably believes that the juror has
freely assented to the verdict." 185 The affirmative request for polling
must occur and is not waived by a failure to object to the trial court's
refusal. 186
In a 1979 opinion, People v. Kellogg,187 the Illinois Supreme Court
established several rules regarding polling a jury. 188 These rules were
as follows:
(1) When a judge polls a jury, each juror should be asked whether
the announced verdict is his or her own; 18 9
(2) The poll should seek to obtain an "unequivocal expression from
each juror";190
(3) The trial court may exercise its discretion to select the specific
form of a question to poll the jury as long as it gives each juror an
opportunity to dissent; 191
(4) If a juror hesitates or indicates some ambivalence in his or her
answer, however, then the trial judge has a duty to determine the juror's
present intent by allowing the juror an opportunity to unambiguously
state his or her present state of mind; 192
(5) During the poll, jurors must be able to disagree expressly, have
the right to inform the court of mistakes, to request permission for the
jury to reconsider its verdict, or to disagree expressly with the
verdict;193
(6) Although the jury polling process should not be "another arena
for deliberations," each juror must have the opportunity to express his
or her opinion without any coercive influences of other jurors and
without influence from the court itself; 194
(7) A court must either discharge the jury or direct it to engage in
further deliberations if a juror dissents from the verdict; 195
185. Id. at 625.
186. DeStefano, 212 N.E.2d at 367-68.
187. People v. Kellogg, 397 N.E.2d 835 (Ill. 1979).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 837.
190. Id.
191. Id. For example, "'Was this then and is this now your verdict?' Id.
192. Id. at 837-38.
193. Id. at 838.
194. Id. For example, the court itself "must carefully avoid the possibility of influencing or
coercing the juror." Id.
195. Id.
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(8) The determination of the trial judge is subject to review, and if
the record reflects that a juror did not assent to the verdict during
polling or the interrogation prevents a juror from dissenting then the
verdict cannot stand. 196
In light of Kellogg, any ambiguity or hesitancy on the part of a juror
during polling should prompt a further colloquy between the judge and
the juror.197 When a juror during polling dissents from a verdict-that
is, states he or she did not agree with the verdict-the proper remedy is
for the trial court to either direct the jury to continue deliberations or
discharge the jury and order a mistrial. 198 However, merely because a
juror states during the polling that reaching a decision was difficult is
not the equivalent of dissent. For example, where a juror responded to
the trial judge's polling of the jury regarding defendant's sentence of
death with, "Reluctantly, yes your Honor," this was not an equivocal
response requiring further inquiry. 199
Additionally, the polling of less than all twelve jurors will not be
considered error when the defense did not object thereto.200 Thus,
where the court clerk forgot to ask two jurors whether this was their
verdict, defendant suffered no prejudice where none of the jurors
expressed dissatisfaction with the verdict before the court accepted it. 20 1
Impeachment of a jury verdict, in which the claim involves the
sufficiency of a juror's answers to polling questions, however, is not
permitted where the concern involves the process by which a verdict is
reached rather than reference to extraneous matter.20 2 To illustrate,
where a juror's answer during polling was that the verdict was a
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., id. (requiring judicial inquiry in response to a juror's question, "Can I change
my vote?"); People ex. rel. Paul v. Harvey, 292 N.E.2d 124, 125-27 (11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1972)
(Court: "Is this and was this your verdict?" Juror: "Well, it wasn't exactly, no" required inquiry
and constituted reversible error); see also People v. Preston, 391 N.E.2d 359, 364-65 (I11. 1979)
(affirming the trial court's decision to inquire and determine if a juror's vote of guilty was proper
when, during polling, juror responded "compromise"). But see People v. Cabrera, 480 N.E.2d
1170, 1173 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1985) (Juror: "Can I say what I have to say or do I have to give
a yes, or no answer?" Court: "Yes or No." Juror: "Yes." The lack of further inquiry was
upheld).
198. People v. Smith, 649 N.E.2d 71, 73-74 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1995) (reversing where
neither further deliberation nor discharge occurred and other evidence indicated that a dissenting
juror may have been coerced to change his verdict).
199. People v. McDonald, 660 N.E.2d 832, 850-51 (I11. 1995).
200. People v. Galloway, 393 N.E.2d 608, 610 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1979).
201. Id.
202. People v. Preston, 391 N.E.2d 359, 365-66 (I11. 1979) (noting that a juror's affidavit that
describes the process of reaching a verdict and the motives behind it is not permitted).
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"compromise" with which she agreed, that answer did not form the
basis for impeachment of the jury's verdict.20 3
B. Completion of Verdict Forms
Very important to the jury trial process is proper completion of
verdict forms. The Illinois Supreme Court has said that "[w]hen the
jury has reached a verdict, the jury foreperson tenders the verdict forms
to the trial judge. It is then his duty to review the verdict and to
determine whether it is proper in both form and substance." 20 4
Therefore, it is implicit that the jury be provided appropriate verdict
forms. 205
A jury's finding "does not become a verdict until it has been properly
received, accepted by the court, and entered into the record. 20 6 Prior to
both rendering a judgment and separating the jury, a trial court may
require the jury to amend the verdict so as to more accurately reflect the
jury's finding.20 7  Thus, where the jurors had erroneously signed an
instruction rather than the verdict forms provided, it was proper to direct
them back to the jury room to complete their task.20 8 Similarly, where
jurors erroneously signed only one of three verdict forms, they were
properly sent back to the jury room.20 9  On the other hand, "once
judgment has been entered and the jury has separated, the trial court is
foreclosed from any action regarding the verdict, except mistrial or
post-trial relief, if circumstances are sufficiently grave to require the
verdict be set aside." 2 10
Once a verdict has been returned, it is considered valid "if the jury's
intention can be ascertained with reasonable certainty." 2 11 "A verdict is
not to be construed with the same strictness as an indictment." 212 For
203. Id.
204. People v. Almo, 483 N.E.2d 203, 207 (11. 1985) (emphasis added).
205. People v. Biggerstaff, 679 N.E.2d 118, 120-21 (11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1999) (finding that
not providing an acquittal option on a verdict form constituted reversible error). In People v.
Biggerstaff, the court held that the verdict form option of "not guilty of first-degree-murder" did
not allow the jury to find the defendant not guilty of involuntary manslaughter, which the
defendant's attorney actively pursued. Id.
206. Almo, 483 N.E.2d at 207 (citing People v. Wilson, 281 N.E.2d 626, 630 (111. 972)).
207. People v. Davis, 433 N.E.2d 1376, 1383 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1982).
208. People v. Arnett, 96 N.E.2d 535, 538-39 (I11. 1951).
209. People v. Wilson, 281 N.E.2d 626, 630 (Ill. 1972).
210. Davis, 433 N.E.2d at 1383. See also Williams v. People, 44 111. 478 (1867), in which the
court held that once a jury is discharged and separated, the jury cannot, without consent of the
accused, be brought together to find another verdict or amend a verdict.
211. People v. Polk, 294 N.E.2d 113, 118 (111. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1973).
212. Id.
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example, a verdict was not void even though it provided that the jury
found the defendant guilty of the offense of indecent liberties with a
child, without the verdict including the material element that he had
engaged in an act of sexual intercourse. 213  In other words, it is only
necessary that the trial court can determine that it was the intent of the
jury to find the defendant guilty of the charge in question. 214 Verdicts
must be construed liberally and "all reasonable intendments indulged in
their support. 215 A verdict is to be held insufficient only if there is a
definite doubt as to its meaning. 216  In determining the meaning of a
verdict, "the entire record is to be searched and all parts of the record
are to be interpreted together." 217  In addition, if the verdict forms
completed by the jury were forms submitted by defense counsel, the
defendant cannot complain about their form. 218
C. Inconsistent Verdicts
1. Guilt Phase
No requirement for logical consistency in verdicts exists so long as
the verdicts are legally consistent. 2 19  Where verdicts inconsistently
acquit and convict of separate crimes arising from the same act, there is
no legal inconsistency (albeit logical inconsistency) where the
respective crimes are composed of different elements. 220 For instance,
a guilty verdict on a charge of aggravated battery is not fatally
inconsistent with an acquittal on a charge of attempted murder because,
although the evidence was insufficient to prove the element of specific
intent to kill, the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant
intentionally or knowingly caused great bodily harm or used a deadly
213. Id.
214. People v. Orlando, 43 N.E.2d 677, 681 (I11. 1942).
215. People v. Bailey, 62 N.E.2d 796, 798 (I11. 1945).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. People v. Villarreal, 761 N.E.2d 1175, 1184 (111. 2001).
219. "Logically inconsistent" verdicts arise when a verdict, although not based on the same
facts, involves "both the acceptance and rejection of the same theory of the case proposed by the
State or defense." People v. Hill, 735 N.E.2d 191, 197 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2000); see also
People v. White, 288 N.E.2d 705, 707 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1972) (finding a guilty verdict on
aggravated battery and an acquittal on attempted murder charges not fatally inconsistent, even
though both charges arose from the same incident). "Verdicts are legally inconsistent if they
necessarily involve the conclusion that the same essential element or elements of each crime were
found both to exist and not to exist." Hill, 735 N.E.2d at 197.
220. People v. Joyner, 278 N.E.2d 756, 760 (I11. 1970) (the Supreme Court required a new
trial after the defendants had been convicted of murder because the record showed that the
defendants could have been found guilty of manslaughter).
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weapon in the commission of a felony. 22 1 "[V]erdicts of guilty of crime
A but not guilty of crime B are legally inconsistent," however, where
both crimes arise out of the same facts and require the same essential
element or elements. 222 Where the jury returns with legally inconsistent
verdicts, it is not error for the trial court to send the jury back to
deliberate the verdicts and return with legally consistent verdicts.
223
In addition, the trial court must be alert to double jeopardy
considerations and the Illinois "same physical act" doctrine. Whether
multiple crimes are considered the same offenses or a lesser-included
offense of a greater offense for double jeopardy purposes is determined
by reference to "whether each provision requires proof of a fact which
the other does not."224 Moreover, in Illinois, prejudice results "where
more than one offense is carved from the same physical act." 225
221. White, 288 N.E.2d at 708; see also People v. Dawson, 326 N.E.2d 755, 756-57 (Ill.
1975) (holding that it is not inconsistent that defendant was found guilty of armed robbery but not
guilty of felony murder); People v. Acevedo, 351 N.E.2d 359, 365 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1976)
(determining that it is not inconsistent for a defendant to be convicted of murder of one victim
and convicted of involuntary manslaughter of another victim).
222. People v. Murray, 340 N.E.2d 186, 194 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1975) (dictum) (citing
People v. Pearson, 306 N.E.2d 539, 542-43 (III. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1973) (finding that the
defendant was guilty on two counts of aggravated battery and not guilty on two counts of armed
violence was legally inconsistent given the same facts and elemental composition of crimes)).
223. People v. Almo, 483 N.E.2d 203, 206-07 (I11. 1985) (holding that where the jury returned
with guilty verdicts on murder and voluntary manslaughter, the trial court properly instructed the
jury to return with verdicts on one or the other, but not both, since it is legally inconsistent for
both verdicts to stand); People v. Britt, 638 N.E.2d 282, 291-92 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1994)
(affirming a first-degree murder conviction and finding that where the jury returned guilty verdict
forms for both first degree murder and involuntary manslaughter, it was not error for the court to
instruct the jury to return to the jury room and find either first degree murder or involuntary
manslaughter).
224. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); see also I JOHN F. DECKER,
ILLINOIS CRIMINAL LAW §§ 1.20-1.24 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing lesser-included offenses). Over
the years, no less than four different approaches to identifying a lesser included offense have
surfaced in Illinois judicial opinions. I id. § 1.20. First, there exists the "statutory definition or
abstract elemental composition approach," which inquires if each offense requires proof of an
element or fact not required of the other. I id. § 1.21. If the language of an offense does not
require proof of a different element or fact when compared to a similar offense, then one of the
offenses (the one requiring proof of less elements or facts) is necessarily a lesser included offense
of the other. I id. Second, there exists the "evidentiary approach," which focuses on the
evidence offered at trial and asks whether the evidence presented offers the possibility that the
accused may either (1) be guilty of a greater crime carrying the greater proof of elements or facts
or (2) be guilty, instead, of a lesser related crime carrying less elements or facts that need to be
proven for a conviction. I id. § 1.22. Third, there is the "pleadings or charging instruments
approach," which looks at the indictment or information charging a defendant with a greater
offense and inquires whether implicit in the greater charge is the possibility of a conviction for a
lesser offense that requires proof of less elements or less facts. I id. § 1.23. Fourth, there exists
an "inherent relationships approach" where similar offenses are examined to determine if they
relate to the same interest so that proof of a lesser offense is necessarily presented as a part of the
showing of the commission of the greater offense. I id. § 1.24. For example, if one were to
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2. Capital Sentencing Phase
In regard to capital sentencing proceedings, inconsistent verdict
claims may appear. In People v. Mahaffey,226 the court rejected a claim
that jury death penalty eligibility verdicts were inconsistent where the
jury returned a finding of eligibility based on murder in the course of a
felony but not on the ground of multiple murders. 227  The defendant
claimed that the murder in the course of a felony involved the mens rea
element of intent or knowledge and that finding was contradicted by the
sentencing jury's refusal to find eligibility based on multiple
murders. 228 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, stated that the jury
could have found the requisite intent or knowledge as to one victim but
not the other, which would account for the discrepancy.
229
Additionally, in People v. Kidd,23° the jury determined that the
defendant was eligible for death for murdering two or more individuals,
but the jury failed to find evidence warranting the death penalty based
on felony murder. 231  The defendant claimed that the refusal to find
eligibility on felony murder was inconsistent with the finding of first-
degree murder under section 9-1(A)(1)-(2) of the Criminal Code of
1961 during the guilt phase of his trial. 232 The Illinois Supreme Court,
however, indicated that the record contained ample evidence that the
examine if theft (taking another's property) is a lesser included offense of robbery (taking
another's property through force or threat of force), the first approach compares the statutory
language of each crime, the second considers the evidence offered at trial and asks whether the
evidence could lend itself to not guilty of the greater offense but guilty of the lesser, the third
considers whether the allegation in the charging instrument not only allege the possibility of
commission of the greater but also implicitly the commission of the lesser crime, and the fourth
focuses on whether each crime carries a common interest, to wit, "taking another's property."
Currently, the Illinois Supreme Court follows the "pleadings or charging instrument approach."
People v. Hamilton, 688 N.E.2d 1166, 1168-70 (I11. 1997). Convicting a defendant of both a
greater offense and a lesser included offense violates the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth
Amendment. 1 DECKER, supra, § 1.19. In the example above, obviously it would be double
jeopardy to convict an accused of both robbery and the lesser included offense of theft if the
accused was only involved in a single taking of another's property.
225. People v. King, 363 N.E.2d 838, 844 (Ill.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 894 (1977). This
doctrine, developed in King, states that it is prejudicial to impose against an accused multiple
convictions that arise out of the "same physical act" where the offenses are, by definition, lesser
included offenses. Id. at 844-45; see also I DECKER, supra note 224, § 1.25 (discussing the
physical act doctrine).
226. People v. Mahaffey, 651 N.E.2d 1055 (I11. 1995).
227. Id. at 1069-70.
228. Id. at 1069.
229. Id. at 1070.
230. People v. Kidd, 687 N.E.2d 945 (Ill. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1084 (1998).
231. Id. at 961.
232. Id.; see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(a)(l)-(2) (2000) (intentional and/or knowing
murder).
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defendant either intentionally or knowingly killed his victims and, thus,
the general verdict finding on first-degree murder was not contradicted
by the jury's eligibility determination regarding felony murder.233
D. Impeaching the Jury Verdict
In some instances, a defendant will attempt to impeach a jury verdict
by resorting to the testimony or an affidavit of a juror that reflects the
jury action was not based on a careful assessment of the evidence.
These efforts fall into two broad categories:
In the first category are those instances in which it is attempted to
prove by a juror's testimony or affidavit the motive, method or
process by which the jury reached its verdict. These, almost without
exception, have been held inadmissible. The second category involves
those situations in which the testimony or affidavit of a juror is offered
as proof of conditions or events brought to the attention of the jury
without any attempt to show its effect on the jurors' deliberations or
mental processes. In most jurisdictions such proof is admissible. 234
An example of the first category of juror impeachment, having no
legal utility, is where a juror alleged the verdict was a result of
"compromise." 235  An example of the second category of verdict
impeachment, which is a basis for attacking a verdict, is a juror's
statement that the jury verdict involved consideration of some type of
"outside influence." 236
233. Id. at 961-62.
234. People v. Holmes, 372 N.E.2d 656, 658 (111. 1978) (citations omitted). An example of
the United States Supreme Court's approach to this issue surfaced in Tanner v. United States, 483
U.S. 107 (1987). In Tanner, a defendant sought to impeach a jury verdict based on a trial juror's
claim that several jurors had consumed alcoholic beverages at lunch during trial, which resulted
in their sleeping through the afternoon proceedings and that a second juror had confirmed the
assertion about jurors' consumption of alcohol. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 113-16. This second juror
also admitted that he and three other jurors had regularly smoked marijuana during the trial and
that another had ingested cocaine during the trial. Id. at 115-16. The Court responded first by
pointing out there existed a "firmly established common-law rule in the United States flatly
prohibit[ing] the admission of juror testimony to impeach a jury verdict." Id. at 117. Later, an
exception to the common-law rule surfaced whereby evidence of "extraneous influence" alleged
to have affected a jury verdict was deemed admissible. Id. This exception, also called "outside
influence," became part of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). Id. at 121. Here, the Court relied on
the inside/outside influence distinction and concluded the alleged juror misconduct was not an
"outside influence" within the meaning of Rule 606(b). Id. at 125. Further, the Court found the
evidence was such that it could not be claimed that the defendant was denied the right to an
impartial and competent jury as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Id. at
126-27.
235. Holmes, 372 N.E.2d at 658.
236. People v. Hobley, 696 N.E.2d 313, 339-41 (II1. 1998) (noting that four jurors were
threatened by non-jurors to find a defendant guilty).
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Case law has held that in a variety of situations, a jury verdict was
not impeached. For example, a deliberating juror's receipt of an
anonymous telephone threat was not sufficient to impeach the
credibility of a jury's verdict and entitle a defendant to a new trial. 237
Similarly, in a case where a jury foreman, who was a police officer,
offered "expert" testimony during deliberations based on his experience
as a police officer and told other jurors that they did not understand
what it was like to be a police officer, his action did not amount to an
injection of outside evidence that would permit impeachment of the
jury's verdict.238  However, where non-jurors approached jurors
sequestered in a hotel restaurant and allegedly made threatening
remarks suggesting that a defendant had to be found guilty, an
evidentiary hearing was required. 239 Finally, where a deliberating jury
foreperson, according to an affidavit of a juror submitted after the jury
had given its verdict, told the other jurors during the capital sentencing
stage that after convicting a defendant of first-degree-murder they were
bound to vote for the death penalty, the statements were not extraneous
matter and merely part of the deliberative process. 240 As such, no
evidentiary hearing involving possible impeachment of the jury's death
penalty verdict was required. 2
41
E. Unique Verdict Problems in Capital Cases
1. Death Penalty Eligibility Findings During Sentencing
In a capital case before a jury, after a finding of guilty to first-degree
murder, the State can request a separate sentencing hearing to determine
the existence of any statutory aggravating circumstances that may
warrant the death penalty ("eligibility stage"). 242 If a jury finds a
defendant to be eligible beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury then
proceeds to examine any information relevant to additional aggravating
factors, as well as mitigating factors ("aggravation and mitigation
stage").243 If a jury unanimously determines there are no mitigating
factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty, a
237. People v. Reid, 583 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (II1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991) (refusing a retrial where
all jurors agreed with the verdict during jury polling, despite a deliberating juror's testimony
regarding the effect of threat on his mental processes, because such testimony was inadmissible).
238. Hobley, 696 N.E.2d at 341-42.
239. Id. at 339-41.
240. People v. Towns, 623 N.E.2d 269, 279-80 (I11. 1993).
241. Id.
242. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(d) (2000).
243. Id. § 5/9-1(e).
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defendant is then sentenced to death. 2 " Considering the sanction at
issue, a body of case law that addresses capital jury verdicts has
developed in recent years.
One type of claim that may arise involves the trial court influencing a
jury's capital sentencing finding. In one case, a defendant was placed
on notice as to the State's intent to seek the death penalty under two
eligibility factors-multiple murder and the exceptionally brutal or
heinous murder of a child.245 The trial judge during sentencing
commented about the "planned" and "preconceived" nature of the
murders, which the defendant claimed he had no opportunity to rebut
because it was not part of the case. 246 The trial court's comments,
which were supported by the evidence, were proper, however, because
"the sentencing body may consider any relevant aggravating factors,
statutory and nonstatutory, in the process of selecting among that class
of defendants who will actually be sentenced to death. 247
2. Problems with Sentencing Stage Verdict Forms
In recent years, the Illinois Supreme Court has addressed the
adequacy of death penalty eligibility phase verdict forms. In People v.
Mack,248 the Illinois Supreme Court declared that an eligibility-stage
verdict form used in a capital case purporting to set out, as a specific
finding, the elements of the offense "must do so completely or be held
insufficient." 249 In Mack, the court deemed a verdict form insufficient
when the form purported to set out the eligibility elements found in
section 9-1(b)(6) of the Criminal Code of 1961, but the verdict failed to
include the requisite mental state of intent or knowledge.250 It read:
"We, the jury, unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
following aggravating factor exists in relation to this Murder. Larry
Mack killed Joseph Kolar in the course of an Armed Robbery." 251 The
court ruled that this "verdict does not state that defendant was found
eligible for the death penalty, nor does it simply state that a statutory
244. Id. § 5/9- 1 (g).
245. People v. Chapman, 743 N.E.2d 48, 60 (11. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 956 (2001).
246. Id. at 83.
247. Id. at 84.
248. People v. Mack, 658 N.E.2d 437 (I11. 1995).
249. Id. at 443.
250. Id. at 439-40 (discussing 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b)(6) (1979)). The defendant
killed the victim in the course of another felony; in performing the acts that caused the death of
the murdered individual, the defendant acted with intent to kill or with knowledge that his acts
created a strong probability of death or great bodily injury; and the felony was one of the
designated felonies. Id.
251. Id.
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aggravating factor [including essential elements thereof] was found to
exist. '"252 As such, the defendant's death sentence was reversed. 253
The death eligibility verdict form does not have to follow any
particular format, nor does it have to use the exact statutory language.
The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that "[w]hile such actions may be
the most efficient way of ensuring the verdict form accurately states the
law, that is not what is required. 254 Thus, where the defendant claimed
the verdict failed to include an affirmative finding that he actually killed
the victim, the verdict's language, "in performing the acts which caused
the death of the murdered person," belied such a claim. 255 Where the
verdict form incorporates the necessary elements, including reference to
the required mental state and the victim's injuries as caused by the
defendant, it is sufficient. 256 In determining the meaning of a verdict,
"all parts of the record will be searched and interpreted together." 257
Where a verdict form is invalid, neither the trial court nor the Illinois
Supreme Court, upon review, can usurp the jury's invalid death-
eligibility verdict by making an independent finding as to the existence
of a statutory aggravating factor without violating the defendant's
constitutionally protected due process rights in having the jury
determine death eligibility. 258 Thus, when a verdict form fails to
include the requisite mens rea, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled,
"deficiency in the eligibility finding is not amenable to resentencing or
harmless error analysis by this court." 259 In that case, the failure of
defense counsel to raise the issue was not dispositive because the error
was considered plain error.260
As previously stated, if an eligibility verdict form omitted the mens
rea, it is clear error. It was not plain error (where defense counsel failed
to object), however, when the same jury during the guilt-innocence
phase of the defendant's trial found the defendant guilty of intentional
or knowing murder of three victims, thus making the requisite finding
252. Id. at 444.
253. Id.
254. People v. Kuntu, 752 N.E.2d 380, 398 (I11. 2001) (citing Mack, 658 N.E.2d at 437).
255. Id. at 397-98 (finding a verdict form sufficient to satisfy 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/9-1 (b)(6) (West 1994)).
256. People v. Williams, 739 N.E.2d 455, 484-88 (Il1. 2000) (satisfying 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/9-l(b)(6) (West 1994)), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953 (2001).
257. People v. McNeal, 677 N.E.2d 841, 853-54 (I11. 1997) (holding that verdict forms merely
containing parenthetical references to the form of first degree murder are sufficient).
258. See People v. Shaw, 713 N.E.2d 1161, 1183 (I11. 1998).
259. People v. Williams, 737 N.E.2d 230, 254 (I11. 2000) (emphasis added) (noting that the
invalid verdict that was based on felony murder), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 996 (2001).
260. Id. at 254-55.
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regarding the defendant's mens rea.26 1 In addition, where a jury during
the guilt phase was instructed as to the mental states of intentional,
knowing, and felony murder of two victims, "[tihe jury's return of [two]
general verdicts [of guilty] raises a presumption of intentional
murder." 262 As such, when the defendant waived his right to a jury for
purpose of sentencing, the trial court was not required to make
additional findings regarding the defendant's mental state when it found
the defendant death-eligible based on multiple murders. 263
Although the court has demonstrated its willingness to invoke the
plain error doctrine when it encounters a defective death eligibility
verdict form, it has not done so uniformly. In one case, failure of the
defense to object to the sufficiency of an eligibility verdict form
constituted a waiver.264
If there are multiple bases for death eligibility, a defendant's
challenge of one verdict eligibility finding is mooted by another that is
satisfactory. 265  In addition, "the fact that the jury was correctly
instructed and returned a legally correct eligibility verdict form is
wholly irrelevant in determining whether the State actually presented
sufficient evidence to prove eligibility." 266 Finally, once the State has
pursued one basis for the death penalty and failed, it would be
261. People v. McCallister, 737 N.E.2d 196, 218 (I11. 2000) (holding no error had occurred
where felony murder and multiple murder verdicts made no reference to mens rea); see also
People v. Childress, 633 N.E.2d 635, 648-49 (Ill. 1994) (finding no reversible error had occurred
where an omission of mens rea on a verdict form occurred, and the same jury made the finding at
the guilt phase that the defendant was guilty of knowing and intentional murder).
262. People v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864, 883 (I11. 2000) (finding that the trial court did not
have to make additional findings regarding mental state at sentencing), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
1043 (2001).
263. Id. at 882-83.
264. People v. Williams, 739 N.E.2d 455, 485-86 (I11. 2000).
265. Id. at 484-88; People v. Buss, 718 N.E.2d 1, 44-46 (111. 1999) (holding that although
death eligibility verdicts based upon felony murder and multiple murder, which omitted necessary
mental states, were invalid, a valid third verdict form based on the murder of a child provided the
basis for defendant's eligibility for capital punishment), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1089 (2000);
People v. Macri, 705 N.E.2d 772, 798-99 (I11. 1998) (affirming a death sentence where a death
eligibility verdict form based on felony murder was invalid for failure to include mens rea, but
another verdict form found defendant eligible under 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b)(1 1), to wit,
murder committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 829
(1999); People v. Jackson, 695 N.E.2d 391, 409-11 (111.) (determining that even though a felony
murder eligibility verdict form was invalid, a multiple murder verdict form formed a basis for
eligibility), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 970 (1998); People v. Williams, 692 N.E.2d 1109, 1122 (I11.)
(holding that where a felony murder eligibility verdict form was invalid, the murder of a police
officer verdict form formed the proper basis for eligibility), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 882 (1998).
266. People v. West, 719 N.E.2d 664, 679-80 (I11. 1999) (holding that the evidence was
insufficient as a matter of law).
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
impermissible to conduct another eligibility determination without
violating double jeopardy. 267
IX. ALTERNATE JURORS
Although the juror replacement procedure is governed by statute, 268
the dismissal of a juror and the "impaneling of an alternate" are at the
discretion of the trial judge. 269 A defendant does have a right to a fair
and impartial jury; however, this is not interpreted to mean that a
defendant has the right to a "tribunal of his own choosing." 270
Moreover, the discharge of a juror by the trial judge does not warrant
reversal, unless there is a clear showing of prejudice to a defendant.271
Courts in several cases have rejected defendants' claims of prejudice,
as a result of a juror having been dismissed and substituted with an
alternate, even once deliberations have begun.272  For instance, a
defendant's claim of prejudice was unwarranted when a juror was
dismissed shortly after deliberations began, upon indicating to the trial
court that he had difficulty understanding English and could not follow
the evidence, and was replaced with an alternate juror who had been
dismissed by the trial court two and one-half hours prior.273
Nevertheless, one court has found that a defendant was entitled to a new
trial because he was prejudiced by an improper jury verdict when an
alternate juror, who was dismissed at commencement of trial, remained
to deliberate with the panel of twelve jurors, stayed overnight with the
sequestered jurors, signed the verdict form, and took part in the jury
polling.274
267. Id. at 681 (remanding for resentencing other than death required).
268. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-4(g) (2000).
269. People v. Rose, 548 N.E.2d 548, 556 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1989) (upholding the
replacement of a juror who was late for trial (citing Snyder v. Poplett, 424 N.E.2d 396, 401 (Il1.
App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1981))).
270. People v. Ward, 609 N.E.2d 252, 265 (Ill. 1992).
271. Rose, 548 N.E.2d at 556.
272. People v. Hudson, 626 N.E.2d 161, 181 (I11. 1993) (upholding the trial court's dismissal
of an ill juror who sat through the guilt/innocence phase of a capital sentencing case, and
assigning an alternate juror who heard all of the evidence at trial and at the sentencing phase
because defendant did not suffer prejudice), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 844 (1994); Ward, 609 N.E.2d
at 265 (finding no prejudice where the trial court dismissed an ill juror and substituted an
alternate juror); People v. Patterson, 413 N.E.2d 1371, 1377-78 (I11. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1980)
(removing a juror was not prejudicial where the juror heard an Assistant State's Attorney in an
elevator refer to a defendant charged with rape as "Chester the Molester," whereupon the judge,
during voir dire of the juror, learned that the juror had not informed the other jurors of the
remark).
273. People v. Hayes, 745 N.E.2d 31, 36-39 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2001).
274. People v. Babbington, 676 N.E.2d 1326, 1333-34 (I11. App. Ct. ist Dist. 1997).
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While Illinois case law states that a deliberating juror may not be
replaced "if the request for discharge stems from the juror's minority
views or doubts regarding the sufficiency of the evidence," 275 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has upheld a
dismissal of a deliberating juror when it was determined that she was
not basing her decision on the sufficiency of the evidence.276 That juror
made comments to other jurors that she did not have to abide by the law
and obey the court's instructions.277 The court held that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the juror for
"impermissible nullification." 278 The court, however, did not decide to
what extent a juror must actively engage in debate before the juror
could be replaced with an alternate. 279 Whether Illinois courts would
likewise deem it appropriate to remove a juror during deliberations
where it was obvious the juror was basing his or her decision about a
defendant's fate on matters beyond the law and the evidence is unclear.
X. CONCLUSION
In a criminal trial, numerous and complex difficulties may arise once
evidence has been presented, arguments made, and instructions given.
A jury may need clarification of instructions or be the recipient of an
extra-evidentiary outside influence. A judge may engage in ex parte
communication that proves problematic on appeal or take actions that
coerce the jury into reaching a verdict. Indeed, at this phase of the
criminal proceeding, the actions or inactions of a judge or jury could
prove to mean the difference between life and death for a capitally
charged defendant. As Yogi Berra once said, "It ain't over 'til it's
over."
280
The jury's deliberations and arrival at a verdict play a critical role in
our criminal justice system and require careful examination by those in
the legal profession. The academician, practitioner, and student of
criminal law must have an understanding of the intricacies that still arise
in this late stage of the trial.
275. Hayes, 745 N.E.2d at 41 n.3.
276. United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286, 1304 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
277. Id. at 1303.
278. Id. at 1304 n. 19. Jury nullification is a controversial concept whereby jurors are allowed
to base their verdicts on concerns, such as their perception that it would be immoral to convict
someone for violating certain laws, rather than basing their decision on the existing law and
evidence presented. See generally M. Kristine Creagan, Jury Nullification: Assessing Recent
Legislative Developments, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1101 (1993).
279. Abbell, 271 F.3d at 1304 n.19.
280. YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK: "1 REALLY DIDN'T SAY EVERYTHING I SAID," 121
(1998).
